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Abstract 
 
Using a newly constructed dataset on German hospitals, which includes 24 process and outcome indicators of 
clinical quality, we test whether quality has increased in various clinical areas since the introduction of 
mandatory quality reports and the online publication of part of the collected quality measures. Our results 
suggest that process indicators of clinical quality have increased significantly in 2008 compared to 2006. In 
addition, the hospitals underperforming in 2006 appear to have increased their clinical quality relatively more 
than the other hospitals. When instead quality is measured by outcome indicators, average clinical quality is 
estimated to have increased for underperforming hospitals and decreased for the best performing hospitals in 
2006, so that on average across all hospitals the changes in outcome indicators are insignificant for just more 
than half of the outcome quality measures. We further show that the best performing hospitals in 2006 in terms 
of outcome quality measures experienced an increase in their share of patients in 2008, thus providing indirect 
evidence that patients react to disclosed quality. Interestingly, the best performing hospitals in 2006 in terms of 
process quality measures did not experience a significant change in their share of patients in 2008, thus 
suggesting that patients react more to output than to process measures of quality. Finally, for the subset of 
hospitals who offer services in obstetrics, we find that higher competitive pressure, measured as the number of 
competitors in a given radius, is associated with a higher increase in quality following quality disclosure. We 
argue that the latter effect is unlikely to be due to selection of patients by hospitals.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Quality is often said to be of higher importance in the health care industry than in any other 
goods or services industry.  First, albeit to some extent trivially, the impact of the quality of 
the health care industry on the well-being of citizens is undisputable. In fact, higher quality 
often implies also a higher chance of survival. Second, it is generally believed that, in the 
health care industry, quality is the main strategic dimension in which hospitals compete, or at 
least should compete, as prices in many countries are regulated by the government and 
consumers do not face those prices fully due to the presence of health care insurance.3 
 
However, in order for quality competition to work in the hospital industry, communicating 
quality information to decision-makers, whether patients or their physicians, is crucial. 
Indeed, health care services are examples of experience, if not credence, goods
4
: patients are 
unable to assess ex-ante, and sometimes even ex-post, the quality of the treatment they 
receive. Information on hospital quality can thus be gathered only from previous personal 
experience or experience of friends, relatives and acquaintances. As a result, a patient’s 
estimate of a hospital’s quality is noisy. Thus, unless objective quality measures are reported 
to them, patients or their physicians cannot choose optimally based on quality. In markets 
characterized by experience or credence goods, in the absence of external quality information, 
firms face lower competition.5 One possible solution, as proposed by Brook and Kosecoff 
(1988), is developing credible quality measures for hospitals and publicizing the outcomes 
for these quality measures. As noted by Ginsburg and Hammons (1988), government 
production of information on quality may be an important component of a competitive 
system”.
6
  
 
For these reasons many countries, particularly those whose governments aim to introduce 
competition in the hospital sector, have witnessed the introduction of policy measures 
favoring the disclosure of quality information to patients.  An example is the UK, where in 
July 2010 the new coalition government issued a white paper titled “Equity and excellence: 
Liberating the NHS”, which was followed by public consultations. A key idea behind the 
proposed reforms was that competition can be used to promote better health outcomes.7 In 
                                                   
3 For early models of quality competition among hospitals see for instance Joskow (1980) and Dranove and Satterthwaite 
(1992). 
4 See Cutler (2002). 
5 See Nelson (1970) for an early contributions on how limited information decreases competition in an industry. 
6 Ginsburg and Hammons (1988), p. 109. 
7 Lyons (2010), pp. 1. 
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this regard, patients are to be provided more freedom to choose and more information which 
will help them choose. As funding will be based on those choices, it is expected that the 
health care providers will have the incentive to provide services in higher quality to attract 
patients. Another example is Germany. Quality disclosure by German hospitals is mandatory 
by law since 2005 8 . Hospitals failing to gather and report quality data face financial 
penalties.9  The quality measures, relating to different modules (either procedures or diseases), 
are defined by the Federal Office for Quality Assurance (Bundesgeschäftsstelle 
Qualitätssicherung or BQS). The latter also decides which of the quality measures will be 
made public. In fact, since January 2007 at least, some quality indicators are available to the 
public at websites such as http://www.bkk-klinikfinder.de/.10 On the latter website and on 
similar ones, which can also be easily reached from the websites of most German insurance 
companies (such as KKH-Allianz, HKK, DAK-Gesundheit), it is possible to search for a 
hospital in a given geographic area which is active in a given medical field. As a result of the 
search one gets the names and locations of the hospitals and some simplified information on 
quality.11  
 
If competition occurs in quality and communicating quality information makes the market 
more competitive by informing decision-makers about the available choices, we would 
expect an increase in clinical quality of hospitals following disclosure of quality information 
to the public. 12 
 
Our paper tests whether it is indeed true that quality increased in German hospitals following 
quality disclosure. We do so using a newly constructed dataset which contains information 
extracted from the above quality reports. To our knowledge, we are the first in the economic 
literature to use these data.13  
 
                                                   
8 § 137, paragraph 3, sentence 1, No. 4 SGB V. 
9 If a hospital reports less than 80 percent of cases (revealed through the number of respective reimbursed cases), payment is 
reduced by 150 € per missing case. See Busse et al. (2009) for more details. 
10 Many other websites provide the same information. Among these are http://www.weisse-liste.de/, http://www.deutsches-
krankenhaus-verzeichnis.de/ and https://www.tk.de/tk/klinikfuehrer/114928. 
11 See the Appendix for more on this website. 
12 In fact, at least to some extent, this increase in quality could also be wasteful if it gave rise to a medical arms’ race. See 
Dranove et al. (1992). We do not address the issue here. It might also lead to a reallocation of efforts from tasks whose 
quality is measured and made public to tasks whose quality is not measured or not reported. See Lu (2012). Again, we 
cannot address this issue with our dataset. 
13 For a review of the literature addressing the question of whether quality disclosure improves quality see Dranove (2011).  
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Compared to similar empirical studies, we employ a much wider range of process and output 
measures of clinical quality for a wider number of service areas. For instance, Chassin (2002) 
analyzes the New York State Department of Health’s reporting program and finds that deaths 
from cardiac surgery fell 41 percent over the first four years of the publication of the report 
cards. Werner et al. (2009) examine the impact of public reporting initiated by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (the Nursing Home Quality Initiative), and find that both 
unreported and reported care improved following the launch of public reporting. They use 
report card scores on the percentage of patients who have “no pain”, “no delirium” and who 
enjoyed “improved walking”. Likewise Lu (2012) reports that scores of quality measures 
improved after the introduction of the Nursing Home Quality Initiative in the U.S. for the 
reported dimensions (“percent of residents who need help with daily activities”, “percent of 
residents who spend most of their time in beds or in chairs”, “percent of residents who lost 
ability to move about in and around their room”, “percent of residents who lose control of 
their bowels or bladders”, “percent of residents who are more depressed or anxious”).14   
 
We first investigate whether hospital quality, measured by 24 different indicators, has 
changed in 9 different service areas in Germany since the publication of quality measures. 15 
To our knowledge we are the first to distinguish between process and output quality measures 
in this context. We then examine if this change differed across hospitals depending on their 
organizational form (for profit, not for profit, public), on their academic status, on their size 
or on their different initial performance levels in 2006.  
 
Our results suggest that process indicators of clinical quality have increased significantly in 
2008 compared to 2006. We find no significant change for hospitals with different 
characteristics, including different organizational form. This result is in line with Lu (2009) 
who reports that nonprofits were as responsive as for-profits to quality disclosure following 
the Nursing Home Quality Initiative in the U.S. However, the hospitals underperforming in 
2006 appear to have increased their clinical quality relatively more than the other hospitals.  
According to Dranove (2011), a similar result is found in Chen (2008) who built a theoretical 
model of vertical product differentiation and found that following Medicare’s Nursing Home 
                                                   
14 For an extensive review of quality disclosure in health care and quality measurement see Dranove and Zin (2010).  
15 For a definition of process and outcome indicators of quality and a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of 
using one versus the other, see Mant (2001). 
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Quality Initiative all nursing home raised quality but that lower-quality nursing homes 
improved relative to high-quality nursing homes.16 
 
When instead quality is measured by outcome indicators, the changes in outcome indicators 
are insignificant for more than half of the outcome quality measures in a regression including 
all hospitals. Yet average clinical quality is estimated to have increased for underperforming 
hospitals and decreased for the best performing hospitals in 2006.  
 
We argue that the latter result, rather than to a simple reversion to the mean, may be due to an 
increase in patients with higher severity diagnosis that chose better performing hospitals as a 
result of the publication of the quality reports. Indeed, we show that the 2006 best performing 
hospitals in terms of output measures witnessed an often significant increase in the share of 
cases in 2008 with respect to 2006.17 Our findings are in line with those of Werner e al. (2012) 
for the U.S. They found that the relationship between nursing home quality on post-acute care, 
as reported by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and nursing home choice was 
positive and statistically significant suggesting that patients were more likely to choose 
facilities with higher reported post-acute care quality after public reporting was initiated. 
However, they found the magnitude of the effect to be small and concluded that there was 
minimal consumer response to information. A stronger response by patients to quality 
disclosure is reported in Varkevisser et al. (2012) for the Netherlands. They examine the 
relationship between hospital quality, as measured by publicly available quality ratings, and 
patient hospital choice for angioplasty using individual claims data from a large health 
insurer. They find that patients have a high propensity to choose hospitals with a good 
reputation, both overall and for cardiology, and a low readmission rate after treatment for 
heart failure. However, they note that since readmission rates are not adjusted for case-mix 
they may not provide a correct signal of hospital quality, so that patients basing their hospital 
choice on such imperfect quality information may end up making suboptimal choices. Our 
results would seem instead to differ from those of Wang (2011) for Pennsylvania. They 
examine the impact of CABG report cards for coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery 
providers’ report cards on a provider’s aggregate volume and volume by patient severity. 
                                                   
16
 The result does not appear to have been published yet. So we can only cite it indirectly. 
17 Also for a review of the literature addressing the question of whether quality disclosure improves consumer choice see 
Dranove (2011), Section 5.3. 
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They find that a reduction of poor performing and unrated surgeons’ volume but no effect on 
more highly rated surgeons or hospitals of any rating. 
 
Interestingly we find that the 2006 best performing hospitals in terms of input measures 
witnessed a generally insignificant increase in the share of cases in 2008 with respect to 2006. 
This might be due to the fact that patients (or their physicians) value more information on 
output measures of quality than on input measures of quality when choosing among hospitals.  
We believe this is not implausible. Indeed, Bundorf et al. (2009) examine the effects of 
providing consumers with quality information in the context of fertility clinics providing 
Assisted Reproductive Therapies (ART) in the U.S. They report that clinics with higher birth 
rates had larger market shares after the adoption of report cards relative to before and that 
clinics with a disproportionate share of young, relatively easy-to-treat patients had lower 
market shares after adoption versus before.  They also found that report cards had larger 
effects on consumers and clinics from states with ART insurance coverage mandates. They 
conclude that not only consumers respond to quality report cards when choosing among 
providers of ART but they also take into account information on patient mix when evaluating 
clinic outcomes.  
 
Finally, for the subset of hospitals who offer services in obstetrics, whose distance from each 
other we could measure, we estimate the impact of competition on the quality differentials 
between 2006 and 2008. We use the number of competitors in a certain radius as a proxy for 
competitive pressure. Our results suggest that there is a significant and positive effect of 
competition on the increase in quality which followed quality disclosure. According to 
Dranove (2011), a similar result is found in Chen (2008) who found that the Medicare’s 
Nursing Home Quality Initiative raised quality more in more competitive markets.18  To the 
best of our knowledge, no other paper addressed the issue. However, more generally, our  
findings are consistent with empirical and theoretical studies suggesting that higher 
competition raises quality.19 
  
                                                   
18
 See note 16. 
19
 There is a substantial literature on the impact of competition on quality in health care markets, both when the price is 
regulated and when it is not. Theoretical models predict that when price is regulated and regulated price is above marginal 
cost, higher competition increases quality. Such a finding seems confirmed in the empirical literature. For an early 
contribution see Robinson and Luft (1980). See instead Gaynor (2006) and Gaynor and Town (2011) for a review. 
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Using national data on Medicare patients at risk for cardiac surgery, Dranove et al (2003) 
found that cardiac surgery report cards in New York and Pennsylvania led not only to 
improved matching of patients with hospitals but also to selection behavior by providers. 
They evaluated that, on net, this led to higher levels of resource use and to worse health 
outcomes, particularly for sicker patients. They concluded that, at least in the short run, these 
report cards decreased patient and social welfare. However, we believe there is no evidence 
in our case that the positive effect of competition on the quality differential is due to hospitals 
facing more competitive pressure rejecting more patients with severe conditions. Indeed, if 
such an effect were present, we would expect it to play a role mainly, if not only, for outcome 
measures of quality, as these are the ones more likely to react to a change in the severity of 
patients. Our finding on the impact of competition on the quality change is instead not 
affected by whether the quality measure is a process or an output measure.  This is to some 
extent in contrast with Bijlsma et al. (2011) who found that competitive pressure explains the 
cross-sectional differences in quality for process measures but not for outcome measures. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the institutional 
background of the health care industry in Germany. Section 3 provides an overview of the 
dataset we use. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 reports the estimation 
results and discusses the empirical findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. THE GERMAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM  
As stated by Busse et al. (2009), the German health care system is dominated by its statutory 
health insurance. As of 2008, this statutory health insurance scheme was operated by over 
200 rival health insurance funds. Participation in one of these funds is compulsory for 
employees whose income is below a certain level (around €48,000 per year), the retired and 
the unemployed, and for other specific groups such as farmers etc. Contributions are 
determined as a percentage of income. As of 2008, the statutory health insurance scheme 
covered about 88 percent of the population. 10 percent of the population was covered by 
private health insurance, with civil servants and self-employed being the largest groups 
excluded from the statutory health insurance. Less than 1 percent of the population had no 
insurance coverage.
20
 
 
                                                   
20  For more detailed information about the scheme, coverage and premia see the following web document: 
http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/CountryProfiles-FINAL-1163.pdf 
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Furthermore, general practitioners have no official gatekeeper function. More generally, 
patients are free to choose ambulatory care physicians and hospitals if inpatient care is 
needed. Ambulatory care in all expertise areas is mainly provided by physicians working 
individually. Insurance funds bargain with the regional associations of physicians on a yearly 
basis to set aggregate payments.  
 
There are a bit more than 1900 hospitals providing inpatient care and receiving diagnosis-
related group payments from social health insurance funds and private health insurance 
companies in Germany. Following the definition of the Statistical Offices of the Lander, three 
hospital types are identified in Germany: public, for-profit and non-profit hospitals. As noted 
by Herr (2008, p.1058), non-profit hospitals are operated by non-profit organizations such as 
churches or miners’ associations. The private for-profit
21
 segment has been growing recently 
(approximately one-sixth of all beds) via takeovers and privatization of public hospitals.22 
Overall, as reported by Tiemann and Schreyögg (2009), the total number of hospitals in 
Germany has fallen and an increasing number of hospitals have been privatized over the past 
decade. 
 
Furthermore, since 2000, the German government has introduced a range of policy reforms 
such as managed care tools and structures (Reform Act of Statutory Health Insurance 2000; 
Statutory Health Insurance Modernization Act 2004; Statutory Health Insurance Competition 
Strengthening Act 2007). According to Schlette et al. (2009), these reforms, inter alia, aimed 
at inducing competition via selective contracting among providers and payers. However, this 
is a rather gradual process where health policy-makers are guardedly supporting selective 
contracts while trying to sustain a system with equal access and service quality for the 
insured population.23  
 
3. THE DATASET 
The quality data is obtained from the Federal Office for Quality Assurance 
(Bundesgeschäftsstelle Qualitätssicherung or BQS). The BQS currently focuses on measuring 
quality in hospitals. Since 2005, quality disclosure by hospitals in standardized format is 
                                                   
21 From a legal point of view, both for-profit and non-profit hospitals are private, i.e. nonpublic.  
22 http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/CountryProfiles-FINAL-1163.pdf 
23
 See Busse and Riesberg (2004), pp. 212. 
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mandatory in Germany by law24 every two years25, and hospitals failing to gather data face 
financial penalties26.   
 
The quality measures are constructed for so-called “modules” (either procedures or diseases) 
by the BQS itself. Most of these measures refer to procedures such as cholecystectomy, hip 
replacement or pacemaker implantation. The original dataset collected by the BQS includes 
quality information for around 200 indicators relating to 26 modules. Busse et al. (2009) state 
that this database is considered to be the largest database monitoring quality in the world. The 
data are reported by the hospitals themselves and mostly made public at the aggregate 
national level. Furthermore, hospitals, which are labeled by the BQS as “underachiever”, are 
asked to explain this outcome in a nonpublic process and, if seen necessary, requested to take 
measures to improve performance.  
 
The information in this dataset can be divided into three subcategories: hospital 
characteristics (such as ownership status, academic status, number of beds etc.)27, process 
measures of quality (e.g. measures evaluating whether certain processes indicated in clinical 
guidelines are administered) and outcome measures of quality (e.g. measures assessing the 
result of medical treatment(s) provided to patients).  
 
However, not all of the dataset is publicly available. In the 2006 and 2008 waves of the 
survey only 28 and 29 indicators respectively were published in standardized reports. In fact, 
most of the outcome measures are not publicly available, since the BQS has argued that an 
appropriate risk adjustment would require the documentation of a variety of concomitant 
diseases, and would thus lead to a an excessive burden of documentation for hospitals.  
 
The standardized reports are available online, which enables the public to search for 
information on quality by hospital or location.28 In addition, the BQS makes available to 
interested researchers the standardized reports in xml format. One report is published for each 
hospital. Hence, for each of the years 2006 and 2008 more than 1900 reports were published. 
                                                   
24 § 137, paragraph 3, sentence 1, No. 4 SGB V. 
25 The first wave of data, relating to 2006, was released in 2007. 
26 More precisely, if they report less than 80 percent of cases (revealed through the number of respective reimbursed cases), 
payment is reduced by 150 € per missing case. 
27 These hospital characteristics are called in the reports structural measures of quality. However, for most of them, such as 
the ownership structure, it is hard to argue that they are measures of quality.  
28 More explanations can be found in the appendix. 
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We extracted the relevant data using a computer program which exploited the standardized 
format of the reports to recover the relevant variables.29 
 
In addition to the mandatory quality data, hospitals can also provide additional information 
on a voluntary basis. Yet, in such a case there is no standardized format, so that comparisons, 
whether across hospitals or in time, are difficult. Also, clearly the provision of this additional 
information is endogenous with respect to the score achieved by the hospital in the quality 
indicator.  
 
Hence, in the current study, we employ 24 standardized quality indicators in 9 treatment areas 
as measures of clinical quality.30 These are reported in Table 1. Twelve of these quality 
indicators are input or process measures, while the remaining twelve are output measures. 
These quantitative indicators are called “quality results” and reported by the hospitals. The 
raw quality scores generally range from 0 to 100. We can distinguish three subgroups of 
quality indicators: (i) Input (or process) quality indicators for which a high score indicates 
good quality, (ii) output quality indicators for which a high score indicates good quality, and 
(iii) output quality indicators for which a low score indicates good quality.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
The BQS does not recommend rankings of the hospitals based on reported quality results. It 
argues for instance that when results in a given service area are very close to each other for 
two hospitals, the difference might just be random and might not be due to difference in 
quality. According to the BQS, it is therefore important that the quality results are examined 
in more detail. These reported quality results are thus benchmarked according to a reference 
range in a process named “structured dialogue”, which constitutes the main touchstone  of the 
BQS procedure when evaluating the quality of hospitals. This investigation is carried out by 
independent experts in relevant fields. In this process, it is determined, for instance, whether 
the results are extraordinarily low and hence the quality requirements are not met and 
whether there are legitimate reasons for this. One such reason might be that the data has been 
                                                   
29 In addition to the hospital level data, each standardized report also contains within hospital information at the department 
level, such as the number of cases in each 4-digit ICD-10 diagnosis, which we do not use in the current paper. There is 
however no quality information at the department level.  
30 Although 28 quality indicators are in theory available, we had to discard 9 of them for different reasons: a) they were not 
reported in 2008 (2 cases) b) there were only a few observations (2 cases) c) the standardization was different between 2006 
and 2008 (5 cases). 
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misreported even though the treatment was performed accurately. Alternatively, the 
structured dialogue might show that there have been a number of unavoidable complications, 
which deflated the relevant quality score. Finally, if the structured dialogue indicates that the 
quality of treatment can be improved, then the hospital agrees to meet targets. 
 
Hence, for each indicator two measures are available in the standardized reports: a 
quantitative one (the so-called quality result) and a qualitative one (the so-called quality 
evaluation). However, as it is possible to see from the description of the structured dialogue 
evaluations in Table 2, they do not allow an ordinal ranking of outcomes and, therefore, it is 
difficult to operationalize them in the econometric estimation. Even though some evaluations 
refer to good quality such as 6 (“Result is positively peculiar after check, i.e. extraordinarily 
good”), 8 (“Result is not peculiar; no structured dialogue necessary”) and 1 (“Result is 
unpeculiar after check”), and some evaluations point to a lower quality such as 3 (“Result is 
for the first time qualitatively peculiar”) and 4 (“Result is repeatedly qualitatively peculiar”), 
there are also other evaluations that provide feedback on non-quality aspects. For instance, 
evaluations 13 (“After completing the structured dialogue, the results are qualitatively 
peculiar because of errors in the documentation”) and 14 (“After completing the structured 
dialogue, the results are repeatedly qualitatively peculiar because of errors in the 
documentation”) indicate that there are errors in the documentation, while some others such 
as 5 read that the hospital refused to make any statement.   
 
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
 
In the current paper we thus rely primarily on the quantitative measures reported by the 
hospitals, i.e. the so-called quality results. We use however information from the structured 
dialogue to check the robustness of the results we find using quantitative indicators.  
 
4. THE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
The aim of our empirical analysis is firstly to check whether hospital quality has increased 
following the publication of quality measures reported in the 2006 wave of the survey. 
 
We thus start by estimating the following linear regression for each quality indicator j: 
 
12 
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[1] 
where ???? is the quality score for hospital i in year t; ε is the normally distributed unobserved 
error term, YEAR 2008 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the year is 2008, 
ia
are hospital 
specific fixed effects aiming to capture the different starting levels of quality in 2006 and β is 
the regression parameter of interest, which measures whether there has been a change in the 
clinical quality across the two waves.  For quality indicators for which a high value means 
higher quality, we would expect β to be positive and significant if quality has improved after 
the publication of the 2006 quality reports. We would expect instead β to be negative and 
significant for quality indicators for which a high value means low quality,  
 
We then proceed by checking whether there has been a differential change depending on the 
hospital’s organizational form by estimating the following fixed effects linear regression, 
again for each quality indicator j and each hospital i: 
 
( ) ( ) it
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[2] 
where υ is the normally distributed unobserved error term, PUBLIC is a dummy variable that 
is equal to 1 if the hospital is a public hospital, PRIVATE indicates that the hospital is a 
private for-profit hospital and the benchmark is the nonprofit organizational form. Here the 
parameters of interest are γ1, γ4 and γ5. 
 
Furthermore, some hospitals are affiliated with medical schools or universities, and may even 
be owned by a university. These hospitals are teaching hospitals and provide clinical 
education and training to future health professionals. Some of these hospitals also have 
research centers for innovative, experimental and technologically advanced services. We thus 
check whether there has been a differential change in quality depending on the hospital’s 
academic status by estimating the following simple linear regression, again for each quality 
indicator j: 
 
( ) ititiijt uZ +++= it21 08  YEAR* ACADEMIC08 YEAR qqa  
[3] 
13 
 
where u is the normally distributed unobserved error term and ACADEMIC is a dummy 
variable which takes the value 1 if the hospital is affiliated with a medical school or 
university. Here the parameters of interest are
1q
and 2q . 
 
We also estimate the following equation to check whether there has been a differential 
change depending on the hospital’s size: 
 
( ) itititiijt eZ ++++= it321 08  YEAR* SIZE0606 SIZE08 YEAR ddda  
[4] 
where e is the normally distributed unobserved error term, SIZE 06 is the number of beds, the 
number of doctors, the number of specialists or the number of doctors in year 2006, and δ1, δ2 
and δ3 are the parameters of interest. 
 
Finally, we restrict our attention to the hospitals providing care in the obstetrics field and 
examine whether competitive pressure  affects the change in quality due to quality disclosure. 
In order to proxy for competition, we use the number of hospitals providing care in obstetrics 
within a given radius. To investigate whether the choice of the radius influences the 
estimation results, we estimate models with 6 different radiuses (5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30). 
We also allow for the impact of competition on the quality differential to change depending 
on the initial level of quality. More formally, we estimate the following specification: 
 
( )
( ) itijt20063
it2t10
ξ *08  YEAR*DIUSCERTAIN RA AIN   HOSPITALSOF NUMBERλ
08  YEAR* DIUSCERTAIN RA AIN   HOSPITALSOF NUMBERλ08 YEARλλ
+
+++=
obstetrics
ij
obstetrics
ijt
Z
Z
 
[5] 
where ξ is the normally distributed unobserved error term, NUMBER OF HOSPITALS IN A 
CERTAIN RADIUS is the number of hospitals providing care in obstetrics within a radius of 5, 
10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 km’s, 
obstetrics
ijZ 2006  represents the quality scores of the three quality 
indicators in obstetrics field (GEBH (737), GEBH (49523), GEBH (82913)) in 2006 to take 
into account the starting level of quality, and λ1, λ2 and λ3 are the parameters of interest. We 
allow here for a differential effect of competition on the quality change depending on the 
initial level of quality in 2006. This is because if higher competition is correlated with higher 
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quality, then in more competitive markets initial quality is higher and there is less room for 
quality to improve following quality disclosure.31  
 
The definitions and the summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation of 
equations (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) are displayed in Table 3. A quick scan of the summary 
statistics shows that the great majority of hospitals in the dataset are either public or non-
profit hospitals. Besides 30 percent of hospitals in our sample are universities or teaching 
hospitals.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
 
Having introduced the data and empirical strategy, we now discuss some econometric issues. 
A potential problem with quality indicators is that the quality might not be accurately 
measured due to the possibility of selective reporting by hospitals. That is, the hospitals might 
omit reporting cases which could decrease the quality scores. Given that hospitals must report 
no less than 80 percent of cases to avoid financial penalties, the remaining 20 percent in 
theory would offer discretion to hospitals to select the cases to report. If the hospitals 
underreported the cases systematically, this would introduce a measurement error on quality 
in our model.  
 
The dataset includes an additional variable, the so-called documentation rate, which measures 
the number of cases over all cases reported by a hospital when constructing the quality results. 
We thus examine the documentation rates for each service area to check whether there is 
room for, and evidence of, strategic reporting. The documentation rates in service areas 
across years can be found in Table 4. Except the service area of Coronary Angiography and 
Percutaneous Coronary Intervention (PCI), the documentation rates for service areas are on 
average above 90 percent. Selection can thus at most affect 10% of the cases, not 20%. In 
addition, as shown in Table 4a, most average documentation rates increased from 2006 to 
2008. Finally, a regression of the documentation rates for the different areas yields in general 
insignificant or positive significant estimates for the coefficient for a year dummy for 2008.32 
                                                   
31 Indeed, if we do not control for the initial level of quality, we find a negative relationship between competition and the 
change in quality. 
32 We conduct further robustness checks for selective reporting in Section 5. 
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Only in two clinical areas (“Cholecystectomy” and “Breast Surgery”) the documentation 
rates appear to have slightly declined. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE> 
 
More generally, being the quality results self-reported by hospitals, one might wonder 
whether some hospitals manipulate their reports rather than underreporting. We believe the 
presence of the structured dialogue per se discourages such a behavior. In addition the results 
of the structured dialogue itself can be exploited to check for the possibility of underreporting.  
Indeed, evaluations of 13 and 14 in the structured dialogue indicate that there are errors in the 
documentation. When we look at the structured dialogue evaluations for the various quality 
indicators, we find that, as shown in Table 5, the average percentage of hospitals with 
documentation errors does not even reach 1 % in most of the service areas.33   
 
<INSERT TABLE 5 HERE> 
 
Overall, even though we recognize that in theory there might be potential problems due to 
underreporting or misreporting, we believe that this is not likely to be the case in practice and 
therefore will not affect our estimates in a considerable way. 
 
5. THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
This section reports the results of the estimation and answers the main research question: 
whether clinical quality in various service areas increased in German hospitals following the 
publication of their quality scores. First, we discuss separately results for process measures of 
quality and output measures of quality. We then show results on whether hospital’s 
characteristics, such as the different types of organizational form, having an academic status 
or size, affect the change in quality from 2006 to 2008. We also perform some robustness 
checks. Finally, we report results on the relationship between competitive pressure faced by a 
hospital and the change in its quality following quality disclosure. 
 
5.1 Quality Change in Input (Process) Measures 
                                                   
33 We conduct further robustness checks for misreporting in Section 5. 
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Table 6 presents the estimates of the coefficient of equation (1) for input or process measures 
for which higher scores imply better quality. The last column reports results for all the 
hospitals for which a given quality measure is available. The first four columns report instead 
the results for hospitals in different quartiles of initial performance, with the hospitals in the 
first quartile being those which performed relatively worst and the hospitals in the fourth 
quartile being those which performed relatively better.  
 
In all regressions, except the one in which the dependent variable is CHOL (44800) 
(“collection of histological findings in cases of cholecystectomy”), we estimated a statistically 
significant positive coefficients on YEAR 2008 implying that the quality scores for process 
measures across waves have increased. As to the quality differentials across hospitals in 
different quartiles of initial performance, the results indicate that the variable YEAR 2008 is 
significant in most of the estimated regression equations.34 More interestingly, the results 
further suggest that the hospitals in the first quartile increased their clinical quality relatively 
more compared to the hospitals in the remaining quartiles. Likewise, the hospitals in the 
second quartile have increased their quality results for process measures more compared to 
the hospitals in the third and fourth quartiles.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 6 HERE> 
 
5.2 Quality Change in Output Measures 
Table 7 presents estimates of the coefficients of equation (1) for outcome measures of quality. 
Again results are displayed separately for each quartile, in the first four columns) and for the 
whole sample (in the last column). When running the regression on the whole sample, the 
coefficient on the year dummy YEAR 2008 points to a statistically significant quality increase 
for five out of twelve outcome quality measures, which are KORO_PCI (69891) 35 
(“achieving the main objective of percutaneous coronary intervention”), KORO_PCI (69889) 
(“proportion of percutaneous coronary intervention in patients without acute coronary 
syndrome”), HUFT_TEP (45059) (“re-operations or re-interventions due to complications 
following hip endoprosthesis”), HUFT_TEP (45108) (“postoperative wound infection”), and  
KNIE_TEP (45059) (“re-operations or re-interventions due to complications following total 
                                                   
34 In some cases, two quartiles of initial performance correspond to the same value. As such these observations cannot be 
distinguished when running a regression. 
35  A high score indicates better quality for this outcome variable whereas a low score indicates better quality for the 
remaining variables. 
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knee endoprosthesis”). However, for the remaining quality indicators the coefficient on the 
dummy variable YEAR 2008 is mostly negative and insignificant. 
 
Nonetheless, looking at the results of the estimation of equation (1) for the single quartiles, 
the coefficients on YEAR 2008 are generally statistically significant. The results on outcome 
measures indicate that the hospitals in the first quartile have increased their clinical quality 
relatively more compared to the hospitals in the remaining quartiles, with hospitals in the 
higher quartile having in fact witnessed a decline in quality. Hence the insignificant 
coefficient estimated for seven out of twelve outcome quality measures when considering all 
hospitals would seem the result of a composition effect. Such an effect might be due to 
simple mean reversal, which together with the previous findings would suggest that the 
random component in the “production process” of quality is possibly more important for 
output quality measures than the inputs. Alternatively, the effect might also be due to an 
increase in the number of patients with severe diagnosis having opted in 2008 for the best 
performing hospitals in 2006. We discuss this further in Section 5.5. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 7 HERE> 
 
5.3 Quality Change across Organizational Forms, Teaching Status and Size 
Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11 display the results of the estimation of equations (2) and (3) which 
allow for a differential change in quality indicators across organizational forms and between 
hospitals with and without academic status, for both process and outcome measures of quality. 
The results suggest that organizational form and academic status did not matter 
systematically for quality differentials, as the interaction term is generally estimated to be 
statistically insignificant in the estimation equation, i.e. the effect of being a private for profit 
or public for profit hospitals. In addition, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients on PUBLIC * YEAR 08 and PRIVATE * YEAR 08 are equal to each other.  
 
Finally, Tables 12 and 13 show the results of the estimation of equation (4). As can be seen 
from the tables, quality differentials do not seem to be systematically related to size, as the 
coefficient on BEDS 06 * YEAR 08 is mostly insignificant. This result suggests that hospital 
size36 -proxied by number of beds- does not matter in determining quality differentials. 
                                                   
36 We have also used number of doctors, specialists, inpatients or outpatients as proxies for size. The estimation results, 
which we do not report here, do not change in a considerable way. 
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<INSERT TABLE 8,9,10, 11, 12, 13 HERE> 
 
5.4 Quality Change and Competition 
Table 14 displays the results of the estimation of equation (5). Here we use three different 
quality indicators in obstetrics field: Presence of pediatrician in cases of premature infants  
(GEBH (737)), prenatal corticosteroid therapy (GEBH (49523)), and E-E-time in emergency 
cases of caesarean (GEBH (82913)). The importance of the first quality indicator arises from 
the fact that premature infants could be better treated by a pediatrician. Furthermore, prenatal 
corticosteroid therapy decreases morbidity and mortality in premature newborns by 
decreasing the likelihood of respiratory disease and dependence on mechanical respiratory 
support. This treatment is commonly recommended for women at risk for premature delivery 
between 24 weeks and 33 weeks of gestation. Finally, the E-E time is the time lag between 
the moment at which the decision for an emergency caesarean section is taken and the birth 
of the child. The lower the E-E-time the lower the risk for permanent damage to the child. 
Rates of E-E-time over 20 minutes indicate organizational problems.  
 
As reported in Table 14, in all regressions, we find a significant positive impact of 
competition on all clinical quality differentials in obstetrics: the coefficient on NR OF 
HOSPITALS IN A CERTAIN RADIUS * YEAR 08 is always positive and statistically 
significant at 1 % significance level. 37  Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect of 
competition on the quality differential in obstetrics field is decreased once the radius is 
widened. The latter result is consistent with nearer competitors exerting more competitive 
pressure than further ones. Indeed, Gaynor et al. (2011) estimated a structural model of 
demand for heart bypass surgery (CABG) in England to evaluate the effect of the reform of 
the English National Health Service, which, inter alia, required referring physicians to give 
patients choice of hospitals. Gaynor et al. (2011) found that not only the demand elasticity 
with respect to a hospital's (risk-adjusted) mortality rate was greater after the reform than 
before, but also find that cross-elasticities between hospitals with respect to their mortality 
rates fall dramatically with distance, indicating that close by hospitals compete with each 
other over quality, but not with hospitals far away.  
                                                   
37
 We do not instrument for competitive pressure here. In fact, we use as a measure the number of competitors in a given 
radius in 2006, which is predetermined with respect to the quality change between 2006 and 2008. Hence, endogeneity 
should not be an issue, differently from studies regressing quality on competitive pressure. See Gaynor and Town (2011) for 
a discussion. 
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<INSERT TABLE 14 HERE> 
 
5.5 Robustness Checks  
We here report results of robustness checks conducted in order to assess whether results are 
driven by selective reporting or manipulation of the data by the hospitals which report the 
data.  
 
First, in order to test whether our results are driven by selective reporting, in addition to the 
preliminary analysis reported in Tables 4a and 4b, we ran again all the regressions in Table 6 
and 7 after having dropped observations relating to hospitals whose documentation rate for 
the service area corresponding to the considered quality indicator declined. Results are 
reported in Tables 15 and 16. They show that the findings discussed above are robust. In 
particular, the coefficient on YEAR 08 turns negative and insignificant in the regression where 
the dependent variable is HSM_IMPL (11265) (“Peri-operative complications: Catheter 
dislocation in ventricle”) in Table 7, and the estimated change in the output quality indicator 
HSM_IMPL (11255) (“Peri-operative complications: surgical complications”) in Table 7 
becomes significant. 
 
<INSERT TABLES 15 AND 16 HERE> 
 
Second, in order to test whether our results are driven by misreporting, in addition to the 
preliminary analysis reported in Tables 5a and 5b, we ran again all the regressions in Table 6 
and 7 after having dropped observations relating to hospitals whose evaluation result for the 
considered quality indicator was either 13 (“After completing the structured dialogue, the 
results are qualitatively peculiar because of errors in the documentation”) or 14 (“After 
completing the structured dialogue, the results are repeatedly qualitatively peculiar because 
of errors in the documentation”). Results are reported in Tables 17 and 18.  Once again the 
results discussed in the previous sections appear robust.  
 
<INSERT TABLES 17 AND 18 HERE> 
 
5.6 Quality change and the share of cases 
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We now investigate whether the share of cases treated in the 2006 best performing hospitals 
has increased in 2008 with respect to 2006 and whether, conversely, the share of cases treated 
in the 2006 worst performing hospitals has declines. If so, there would be evidence that 
patients (or their referring physicians) respond to quality. We first construct market shares for 
a hospital by dividing the number of cases handled in that hospital in each of the 9 service 
areas by the total number of cases handled in all hospitals in that service area. Finally, we 
divide hospitals in quartiles based on their 2006 quality score and estimate the following 
specification for each quartile of 2006 quality of the corresponding quality indicator: 
 
ijtitiijtS wlk ++= 08 YEAR1  
[6] 
 
where ???? is the market share of hospital i in year t for the treatment area j; ω is the normally 
distributed unobserved error term, YEAR 2008 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the year is 
2008 and 1l  is the regression parameter of interest.  
 
<INSERT TABLES 19 AND 20 HERE> 
 
Tables 19 and 20 display the estimation results of equation [6]. The estimation results for 
process measures in Table 19 indicate that the market shares did not change significantly for 
the hospitals in all quartiles of 2006 quality, except for the quality indicator “Indication for 
coronary angiography: Ischemia symptoms” (KORO_PCI (43757)). On the other hand, as 
shown in Table 20, the market shares of the best performing hospitals in 2006 significantly 
increased for 6 out of 12 outcome measures. For 5 of the remaining 6, the increase was still 
positive but statistically insignificant. This would seem to suggest that patients (or their 
physicians) react to output quality measures (but not to input quality measures)38. It also 
suggests that the decline in quality for the 2006 best performing hospitals may indeed be due, 
at least in part, to a relative increase in the number of patients and probably to an increase in 
the average severity of the patients rather than simply being due to mean reversion. 39 
                                                   
38 A caveat is however necessary in interpreting the results. The number of cases on which the hospitals “fictitious” market 
shares are calculated refers to the service area. More than one quality measure is available for each quality area. Thus, not all 
quality measures of a given service area may be relevant for all cases in that service area.  
39 A better test would have been to check whether the average severity of the patients/cases for which a given quality 
indicator is relevant increased in 2008 with respect 2006 for the best performing hospitals. We lack, however, data on 
severity of patients/cases and, as mentioned above, also a mapping of cases to quality indicators. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of the current study was to test whether clinical quality in hospitals 
increases with the publication of quality results by an external authority. In fact, such a 
question is crucial for the current debate on the reform of health care systems in many 
European countries. An example is the debate around the UK government white-paper on 
“Equity and excellence: Liberating the NHS” published in 2010. 
 
We conducted our analysis using data obtained from the Federal Office for Quality 
Assurance in Germany. Since 2005, quality disclosure by hospitals in standardized format is 
mandatory in Germany by law every two years. The Federal Office for Quality Assurance is 
in charge of defining the indicators to be reported and to decide which quality indicators to 
disclose to the public. The standardized reports that include the latter indicators are available 
online and a number of dedicated websites exist which enable the public to search for 
information on quality by hospital or location.  
 
We used data on 24 different public quality indicators for 9 different service areas for 
German hospitals for the years 2006 and 2008. Compared to most other studies, we thus 
employed a much higher number of indicators for a larger number of service areas. Also, to 
the best of our knowledge, we were the first in the empirical economic literature to use these 
data. 
 
Our estimates indicate that clinical quality measured by process indicators has increased 
significantly in 2008 compared to 2006, suggesting that quality is indeed the strategic 
variable on which competition takes place in the hospital market.  
 
We have also examined whether the increase in quality differed across hospitals with a 
different initial performance in terms of quality in 2006. The results on both process and 
outcome measures suggest that the underperforming hospitals in 2006 have been able to 
increase their clinical quality relatively more than other hospitals. 
 
One reason explaining the increase in quality scores for process measures of clinical quality 
could be that, in order to sustain competition in the presence of gradually pervading selective 
contracting in Germany, hospitals might find it crucial to increase the quality that will be 
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displayed to the public. In other words, increased quality is a result of hospitals’ perception 
that competition in the market takes place on quality. Lacking information on patients and 
costs, we cannot estimate the welfare effects of the observed quality change. As a result we 
cannot completely rule out the hypothesis of a medical arms’ race having taken place. In fact, 
this would be an interesting topic for further research. 
 
Although the quality differentials for outcome indicators are insignificant for approximately 
half of the quality measures when estimated using data on all hospitals, nonetheless, average 
clinical quality is estimated to have increased for underperforming hospitals and decreased 
for the best performing hospitals in 2006.  
 
A possible explanation for the more pronounced increase in process measures compared to 
outcome measures might be that hospitals have more control over process quality rather than 
over outcome quality, since the latter is also affected by the patients’ condition.  The finding 
that quality measured by output indicators has increased for underperforming hospitals and 
decreased for the better performing ones may then be due to a simple mean reversal, if the 
assignment of patients’ conditions to hospitals is mainly random, or to an increase in patients 
with higher severity diagnosis that chose better performing hospitals as a result of the 
publication of the quality reports. 
  
As we do not have data on severity of patients, we could not rule out a case of simple mean 
reversion. However, we further showed that the share of cases for the best performing 
hospitals in terms of output measures increased  in 2008 with respect to 2006, thus providing 
some evidence that  patients (or their physicians) react to output quality measures and 
suggesting that the decline in output measures of quality for the 2006 best performing 
hospitals may indeed be due, at least in part, to a relative increase in the number of patients 
and to a corresponding increase in the average severity of the patients rather than simply 
being due to mean reversion.  
 
Interestingly we find that the 2006 best performing hospitals in terms of input measures 
witnessed a generally insignificant increase in the share of cases in 2008 with respect to 2006. 
We argued that this might be due to the fact that patients (or their physicians) value more 
information on output measures of quality than on input measures of quality when choosing 
among hospitals. 
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Finally, we constrained our attention to the obstetrics field and estimated the impact of 
competition -proxied by the number of competitors in a certain radius- on quality differentials. 
Our estimation results suggest that there is a significant and positive effect of competition on 
quality differentials, meaning that higher competitive pressure leads to higher increases in 
quality following quality disclosure and thus providing additional evidence that competition 
takes place on quality. Lacking data on severity of patients’ conditions, we cannot rule out 
that the positive effect of competition on the quality differential is due to hospitals facing 
more competitive pressure rejecting more patients with severe conditions, as discussed in 
Dranove et al (2003), an issue which is clearly of great policy relevance. Still our finding is 
not affected by whether the quality measure is a process or an output measure. This would 
seem to suggest that the main force is not the selection of cases by hospitals. If it were, we 
would expect the effect to be at play mainly, if not only, for outcome measures of quality. 
 
All in all, since most of the previous work had focused on a few quality measures, often from 
nursing homes, we believe to have contributed to the literature and the debate on the impact 
of quality disclosure on quality supply in the health care market by providing evidence from a 
larger set of quality measures for the hospital market. Whereas our results may be interpreted 
as suggesting that quality disclosure increases quality supply in this market, reduces the 
differences in quality among hospitals and is more effective the more competition hospitals 
face, we were only able to provide only indirect, and arguably non-conclusive, evidence on 
the role played by patients in the process. Moving in that direction would require gathering 
information on the number of different diagnosis by hospitals, ranking them in terms of 
severity and mapping them to reported quality measures. We consider this an interesting 
direction for future research.  
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o
d
e
 
E
x
p
la
n
a
ti
o
n
 
C
h
o
le
c
y
st
e
c
to
m
y
 
C
o
ll
e
c
ti
o
n
 o
f 
h
is
to
lo
g
ic
a
l 
fi
n
d
in
g
s 
C
H
O
L
 
(4
4
8
0
0
) 
A
ft
e
r 
re
m
o
v
a
l,
 t
h
e
 g
a
ll
b
la
d
d
e
r 
is
 s
e
n
t 
fo
r 
p
a
th
o
lo
g
ic
a
l 
e
x
a
m
in
a
ti
o
n
 u
n
d
e
r 
m
ic
ro
sc
o
p
e
 t
o
 c
o
n
fi
rm
 
th
e
 d
ia
g
n
o
si
s 
a
n
d
 l
o
o
k
 f
o
r 
a
n
 i
n
c
id
e
n
ta
l 
m
a
li
g
n
a
n
c
y
 o
f 
th
e
 g
a
ll
 b
la
d
d
e
r.
 
R
e
-i
n
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
 r
a
te
 
C
H
O
L
 
(4
4
9
2
7
) 
A
 r
e
-i
n
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
 i
s 
a
n
o
th
e
r 
su
rg
ic
a
l 
o
r 
in
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
a
l 
p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
 a
ft
e
r 
su
rg
e
ry
 f
o
r 
p
o
st
o
p
e
ra
ti
v
e
 
c
o
m
p
li
c
a
ti
o
n
s.
 
T
y
p
ic
a
l 
re
a
so
n
s 
fo
r 
re
-i
n
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
 
a
ft
e
r 
c
h
o
le
c
y
st
e
c
to
m
y
 
in
c
lu
d
e
 
b
il
e
 
d
u
c
t 
in
ju
ry
, 
b
le
e
d
in
g
 o
r 
in
fl
a
m
m
a
ti
o
n
. 
T
h
e
 r
a
te
 o
f 
re
-i
n
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
, 
th
e
re
fo
re
, 
p
ro
v
id
e
s 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 o
n
 
th
e
 i
n
c
id
e
n
c
e
 o
f 
se
ri
o
u
s 
e
a
rl
y
 c
o
m
p
li
c
a
ti
o
n
s.
 
O
b
st
e
tr
ic
s 
P
re
se
n
c
e 
o
f 
p
e
d
ia
tr
ic
ia
n
 f
o
r 
p
re
m
a
tu
re
 i
n
fa
n
ts
 
G
E
B
H
 
(7
3
7
) 
P
re
m
a
tu
re
 i
n
fa
n
ts
 s
h
o
u
ld
 b
e
 t
re
a
te
d
 b
y
 p
e
d
ia
tr
ic
ia
n
s,
 w
h
o
 a
re
 s
p
e
c
ia
li
z
e
d
 p
h
y
si
c
ia
n
s.
 
P
re
n
a
ta
l 
c
o
rt
ic
o
st
e
ro
id
 t
h
e
ra
p
y
: 
in
 c
a
se
 o
f 
b
ir
th
s 
w
it
h
 a
 g
e
st
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a
g
e
 o
f 
2
4
+
0
-3
4
+
0
 w
e
e
k
s 
(e
x
c
lu
d
in
g
 s
ti
ll
b
ir
th
s)
 a
n
d
 b
ir
th
s 
w
it
h
 a
 p
re
n
a
ta
l 
h
o
sp
it
a
l 
st
a
y
 o
f 
a
t 
le
a
st
 t
w
o
 c
a
le
n
d
a
r 
d
a
y
s 
G
E
B
H
 
(4
9
5
2
3
) 
P
re
n
a
ta
l 
c
o
rt
ic
o
st
e
ro
id
 
th
e
ra
p
y
 
d
e
cr
e
a
se
s 
m
o
rb
id
it
y
 
a
n
d
 
m
o
rt
a
li
ty
 
in
 
p
re
m
a
tu
re
 
n
e
w
b
o
rn
s 
b
y
 
d
e
c
re
a
si
n
g
 
th
e
 
li
k
e
li
h
o
o
d
 
o
f 
re
sp
ir
a
to
ry
 
d
is
e
a
se
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 
o
n
 
m
e
c
h
a
n
ic
a
l 
re
sp
ir
a
to
ry
 
su
p
p
o
rt
. 
T
h
is
 t
re
a
tm
e
n
t 
is
 c
o
m
m
o
n
ly
 r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
e
d
 f
o
r 
w
o
m
e
n
 a
t 
ri
sk
 f
o
r 
p
re
m
a
tu
re
 d
e
li
v
e
ry
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 2
4
 w
e
e
k
s 
a
n
d
 3
3
 w
e
e
k
s 
o
f 
g
e
st
a
ti
o
n
. 
E
-E
-t
im
e
 i
n
 e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 c
a
e
sa
re
a
n
 c
a
se
s 
G
E
B
H
 
(8
2
9
1
3
) 
T
h
e
 
E
-E
 
ti
m
e
 
is
 
th
e
 
ti
m
e
 
la
g
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 
th
e 
m
o
m
e
n
t 
a
t 
w
h
ic
h
 
th
e
 
d
e
c
is
io
n
 
fo
r 
a
n
 
e
m
e
rg
e
n
c
y
 
c
a
e
sa
re
a
n
 s
ec
ti
o
n
 i
s 
ta
k
e
n
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
b
ir
th
 o
f 
th
e
 c
h
il
d
. 
T
h
e
 l
o
w
e
r 
th
e
 E
-E
-t
im
e
 t
h
e
 l
o
w
e
r 
th
e
 r
is
k
 
fo
r 
p
e
rm
a
n
e
n
t 
d
a
m
a
g
e
 t
o
 t
h
e
 c
h
il
d
. 
R
a
te
s 
o
f 
E
-E
-t
im
e
 o
ve
r 
2
0
 m
in
u
te
s 
in
d
ic
a
te
 o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
p
ro
b
le
m
s.
 
G
y
n
e
c
o
lo
g
ic
a
l 
S
u
rg
e
ry
 
A
n
ti
b
io
ti
c
 p
ro
p
h
y
la
x
is
  
in
 h
y
st
e
re
c
to
m
y
 c
a
se
s 
G
Y
N
_
O
P
 
(4
7
6
3
7
) 
A
 h
y
st
e
re
c
to
m
y
 i
s 
th
e
 s
u
rg
ic
a
l 
re
m
o
va
l 
o
f 
th
e
 u
te
ru
s.
 W
o
u
n
d
 i
n
fe
c
ti
o
n
s 
a
ft
e
r 
h
y
st
e
re
c
to
m
y
 l
e
a
d
 
to
 
h
ig
h
 
p
h
y
si
c
a
l 
a
n
d
 
m
e
n
ta
l 
st
re
ss
, 
a
n
d
 
h
a
ve
 
d
ir
e
c
t 
a
n
d
 
in
d
ir
e
c
t 
c
o
st
s.
 
In
 
a
 
m
e
ta
 
a
n
a
ly
si
s,
 
M
it
te
n
d
o
rf
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
1
9
9
3
) 
a
rg
u
e
 t
h
a
t 
w
o
u
n
d
 i
n
fe
c
ti
o
n
s 
a
ft
e
r 
h
y
st
e
re
c
to
m
y
 c
a
n
 b
e
 r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 b
y
 a
b
o
u
t 
1
2
 %
 i
f 
tr
e
a
te
d
 v
ia
 a
n
ti
b
io
ti
c
 p
ro
p
h
y
la
x
is
, 
w
h
ic
h
 i
s 
a
 m
e
a
su
re
 t
a
k
e
n
 t
o
 p
re
v
e
n
t 
in
fe
c
ti
o
n
s 
u
si
n
g
 
a
n
ti
b
io
ti
c
s.
  
T
h
ro
m
b
o
p
ro
p
h
y
la
x
is
  
in
 h
y
st
e
re
c
to
m
y
 c
a
se
s 
G
Y
N
_
O
P
 
(5
0
5
5
4
) 
D
e
e
p
 v
e
n
o
u
s 
th
ro
m
b
o
si
s 
(t
h
ro
m
b
o
e
m
b
o
li
sm
),
 w
h
ic
h
 m
ig
h
t 
b
e
 c
a
u
se
d
 b
y
 a
 r
e
c
e
n
t 
su
rg
e
ry
, 
is
 
a
 b
lo
o
d
 
c
lo
t 
th
a
t 
fo
rm
s 
in
 
a
 
ve
in
 
d
e
e
p
 
in
si
d
e
 
a
 
p
a
rt
 
o
f 
th
e
 
b
o
d
y
4
0
. 
It
 
is
 
th
e
 
m
o
st
 
c
o
m
m
o
n
 
p
re
ve
n
ta
b
le
 c
a
u
se
 o
f 
d
e
a
th
 i
n
 s
u
rg
ic
a
l 
p
a
ti
e
n
ts
. 
T
h
ro
m
b
o
p
ro
p
h
y
la
x
is
, 
u
si
n
g
 m
e
c
h
a
n
ic
a
l 
m
e
th
o
d
s 
to
 p
ro
m
o
te
 v
e
n
o
u
s 
o
u
tf
lo
w
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e
 l
e
g
s 
a
n
d
 a
n
ti
th
ro
m
b
o
ti
c
 d
ru
g
s,
 p
ro
v
id
e
s 
th
e
 m
o
st
 e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
 
m
e
a
n
s 
o
f 
re
d
u
c
in
g
 m
o
rb
id
it
y
 a
n
d
 m
o
rt
a
li
ty
 i
n
 t
h
e
se
 p
a
ti
e
n
ts
4
1
. 
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b
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b
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T
a
b
le
 1
b
: 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 o
f 
Q
u
a
li
ty
 I
n
d
ic
a
to
rs
 a
n
d
 S
u
m
m
a
ry
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
S
e
rv
ic
e
 A
re
a
 
Q
u
a
li
ty
 I
n
d
ic
a
to
r 
C
o
d
e
 
E
x
p
la
n
a
ti
o
n
 
P
ac
e
m
ak
er
 
Im
p
la
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
G
u
id
el
in
e 
co
n
fo
rm
it
y
: 
in
d
ic
at
io
n
 f
o
r 
b
ra
d
y
d
y
sr
h
y
th
m
ia
 
H
S
M
_
IM
P
L
 
(9
9
6
2
) 
B
ra
d
y
d
y
sr
h
y
th
m
ia
 i
s 
th
e 
re
st
in
g
 o
f 
h
ea
rt
 r
at
e
 o
f 
le
ss
 t
h
an
 6
0
 m
in
u
te
s 
p
er
 m
in
u
te
, 
w
h
ic
h
 m
ea
n
s 
th
at
 t
h
e
 
h
ea
rt
 r
at
e 
is
 a
b
n
o
rm
al
ly
 s
lo
w
ed
 a
n
d
 a
 d
is
tu
rb
an
ce
 i
n
 t
h
e 
h
ea
rt
 r
h
y
th
m
 h
as
 o
cc
u
rr
ed
. 
A
 p
a
ce
m
ak
er
 i
s 
a
 
m
ed
ic
al
 d
e
vi
ce
 t
h
at
 u
se
s 
el
ec
tr
ic
al
 i
m
p
u
ls
es
 t
o
 r
eg
u
la
te
 t
h
e 
b
ea
ti
n
g
 o
f 
th
e 
h
ea
rt
. 
T
h
e 
G
e
rm
an
 C
ar
d
ia
c
 
S
o
ci
et
y
 
is
su
ed
 
d
et
ai
le
d
 
g
u
id
el
in
es
 
o
n
 
p
ac
e
m
ak
er
 
im
p
la
n
ta
ti
o
n
, 
w
h
ic
h
 
ar
e
 
d
ec
is
iv
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
q
u
al
it
y
 
as
su
ra
n
ce
 
in
 
G
er
m
an
y
, 
an
d
 
th
is
 
q
u
al
it
y
 
in
d
ic
at
o
r 
sh
o
w
s 
w
h
et
h
er
 
th
e 
g
u
id
el
in
es
 
ar
e
 
ad
h
er
ed
 
fo
r 
in
d
ic
at
io
n
 i
n
 a
 b
ra
d
y
d
y
sr
h
y
th
m
ia
 c
as
e.
  
G
u
id
el
in
e 
co
n
fo
rm
it
y
: 
sy
st
e
m
 c
h
o
ic
e 
in
 
b
ra
d
y
d
y
sr
h
y
th
m
ia
 c
as
es
 
H
S
M
_
IM
P
L
 
(7
5
9
7
3
) 
T
h
e
re
 a
re
 v
a
ri
o
u
s 
p
a
c
e
m
a
k
e
r 
sy
st
e
m
s 
d
e
p
e
n
d
in
g
 o
n
 t
h
e
 u
n
d
e
rl
y
in
g
 r
h
y
th
m
 d
is
o
rd
e
r.
 T
h
e 
G
e
rm
an
 C
ar
d
ia
c
 
S
o
ci
et
y
’s
 
g
u
id
el
in
es
 
p
ro
vi
d
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
 
re
co
m
m
e
n
d
at
io
n
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
ch
o
ic
e 
o
f 
sy
st
e
m
, 
an
d
 
th
is
 
q
u
al
it
y
 
in
d
ic
at
o
r 
sh
o
w
s 
w
h
et
h
er
 t
h
e 
g
u
id
el
in
es
 a
re
 a
d
h
er
ed
. 
 
P
er
i-
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
co
m
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s:
 S
u
rg
ic
al
 
co
m
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s 
H
S
M
_
IM
P
L
 
(1
1
2
5
5
) 
T
h
is
 
q
u
a
li
ty
 
in
d
ic
a
to
r 
in
d
ic
a
te
s 
h
o
w
 
fr
e
q
u
e
n
t 
su
rg
ic
a
l 
c
o
m
p
li
c
a
ti
o
n
s 
o
c
c
u
r 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 
p
a
c
e
m
a
k
e
r 
im
p
la
n
ta
ti
o
n
. 
T
h
e
se
 
su
rg
ic
a
l 
c
o
m
p
li
c
a
ti
o
n
s 
in
c
lu
d
e
 
a
rr
h
y
th
m
ia
s,
 
p
e
rf
o
ra
ti
o
n
s 
o
f 
b
lo
o
d
 
ve
ss
e
ls
 
a
n
d
 
h
e
a
rt
 
m
u
sc
le
, 
e
m
b
o
li
sm
 e
tc
. 
P
er
io
p
er
at
iv
e 
co
m
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s:
 
C
at
h
et
er
 d
is
lo
ca
ti
o
n
 i
n
 
at
ri
u
m
 
H
S
M
_
IM
P
L
 
(1
1
2
6
4
) 
T
h
is
 
q
u
a
li
ty
 
in
d
ic
a
to
r 
in
d
ic
a
te
s 
h
o
w
 
fr
e
q
u
e
n
t 
c
a
th
e
te
r 
d
is
lo
c
a
ti
o
n
 
in
 
a
tr
iu
m
 
o
c
c
u
rs
 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 
p
a
c
e
m
a
k
e
r 
im
p
la
n
ta
ti
o
n
. 
P
er
io
p
er
at
iv
e 
co
m
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s:
 
C
at
h
et
er
 d
is
lo
ca
ti
o
n
 i
n
 
v
en
tr
ic
le
 
H
S
M
_
IM
P
L
 
(1
1
2
6
5
) 
T
h
is
 q
u
a
li
ty
 i
n
d
ic
a
to
r 
in
d
ic
a
te
s 
h
o
w
 f
re
q
u
e
n
t 
c
a
th
e
te
r 
d
is
lo
c
a
ti
o
n
 i
n
 v
e
n
tr
ic
le
 o
c
c
u
rs
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 p
a
c
e
m
a
k
e
r 
im
p
la
n
ta
ti
o
n
. 
H
ip
 E
n
d
o
p
ro
st
h
es
is
: 
In
it
ia
l 
Im
p
la
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
E
n
d
o
p
ro
st
h
es
is
 d
is
lo
ca
ti
o
n
 
H
U
F
T
-T
E
P
 
(4
5
0
1
3
) 
E
n
d
o
p
ro
st
h
es
is
 d
is
lo
ca
ti
o
n
 i
s 
a 
m
aj
o
r 
co
m
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
 a
ft
er
 t
o
ta
l 
h
ip
 e
n
d
o
p
ro
st
h
es
is
, 
an
d
 i
t 
is
 v
er
y
 s
tr
es
sf
u
l 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
at
ie
n
t.
 I
t 
u
su
al
ly
 o
cc
u
rs
 w
it
h
in
 t
h
e 
fi
rs
t 
ei
g
h
t 
p
o
st
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
w
e
ek
s.
 T
h
e 
d
is
lo
ca
ti
o
n
 r
eq
u
ir
es
 a
 
se
co
n
d
 s
u
rg
e
ry
, 
an
d
 t
h
is
 s
u
rg
er
y
 a
ff
e
ct
s 
p
at
ie
n
ts
 w
it
h
 w
ea
k
en
ed
 a
b
d
u
ct
o
r 
m
u
sc
le
s 
o
r 
n
e
u
ro
m
u
sc
u
la
r 
d
ef
ic
it
s.
  
P
o
st
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
w
o
u
n
d
 
in
fe
ct
io
n
 
H
U
F
T
-T
E
P
 
(4
5
1
0
8
) 
P
o
st
o
p
e
ra
ti
v
e
 
w
o
u
n
d
 
in
fe
c
ti
o
n
 
is
 
a
n
 
in
fe
c
ti
o
n
 
in
 
th
e
 
o
p
e
ra
ti
ve
 
a
re
a
. 
T
h
is
 
q
u
a
li
ty
 
in
d
ic
a
to
r 
in
d
ic
a
te
s 
h
o
w
 
fr
e
q
u
e
n
t 
p
o
st
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
w
o
u
n
d
 i
n
fe
ct
io
n
 i
s 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 h
ip
 e
n
d
o
p
ro
st
h
es
is
 s
u
rg
er
y
. 
R
eo
p
er
at
io
n
s 
(o
r 
re
-
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
s)
 d
u
e 
to
 
co
m
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s 
H
U
F
T
-T
E
P
 
(4
5
0
5
9
) 
U
n
p
la
n
n
e
d
 r
e
-o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
s 
a
re
 d
u
e
 t
o
 c
o
m
p
li
c
a
ti
o
n
s 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 t
h
e
 p
ri
m
a
ry
 s
u
rg
e
ry
. 
T
h
e
 o
ve
ra
ll
 r
a
te
 o
f 
se
c
o
n
d
a
ry
 p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s 
is
 a
n
 i
n
d
ic
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e
 q
u
a
li
ty
 o
f 
a
 h
o
sp
it
a
l.
 
 
 
 
3
0
 
 
T
a
b
le
 1
c:
 D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 o
f 
Q
u
a
li
ty
 I
n
d
ic
a
to
rs
 a
n
d
 S
u
m
m
a
ry
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
S
e
rv
ic
e
 A
re
a
 
Q
u
a
li
ty
 I
n
d
ic
a
to
r 
C
o
d
e
 
E
x
p
la
n
a
ti
o
n
 
C
ar
o
ti
d
 R
ec
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
 
In
d
ic
at
io
n
 f
o
r 
as
y
m
p
to
m
at
ic
 
ca
ro
ti
d
 s
te
n
o
si
s 
K
A
R
O
T
 
(9
5
5
6
) 
C
ar
o
ti
d
 s
te
n
o
si
s 
m
ea
n
s 
n
ar
ro
w
in
g
 o
r 
co
n
st
ri
ct
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
in
n
er
 s
u
rf
ac
e 
o
f 
th
e 
ca
ro
ti
d
 
ar
te
ry
. 
C
ar
o
ti
d
 e
n
d
ar
te
re
ct
o
m
y
 i
s 
a 
su
rg
ic
al
 p
ro
ce
d
u
re
 t
o
 c
o
rr
ec
t 
st
en
o
si
s.
 H
o
w
e
v
e
r,
 i
n
 
d
ec
id
in
g
 t
o
 p
er
fo
rm
 t
h
e 
su
rg
er
y
, 
it
 i
s 
im
p
o
rt
an
t 
to
 f
o
ll
o
w
 t
h
e 
p
ro
v
en
 i
n
d
ic
at
io
n
s 
in
 
tr
ea
ti
n
g
 
p
eo
p
le
 
w
it
h
 
as
y
m
p
to
m
at
ic
 
ca
ro
ti
d
 
st
en
o
si
s.
 
T
h
es
e 
p
ro
v
en
 
in
d
ic
at
io
n
s 
ar
e
 
su
m
m
ar
iz
ed
 i
n
 a
 p
ap
er
 b
y
 A
m
er
ic
an
 H
ea
rt
 A
ss
o
ci
at
io
n
 (
B
il
le
r 
et
 a
l.
 1
9
9
8
).
  
 
P
er
i-
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
st
ro
k
e 
o
r 
d
e
at
h
 
in
 r
is
k
-a
d
ju
st
ed
 l
o
g
is
ti
ca
l 
ca
ro
ti
d
 -
 S
co
re
 I
 
K
A
R
O
T
 
(6
8
4
1
5
) 
It
 i
s 
li
k
e
ly
 t
h
a
t 
p
a
ti
e
n
ts
 s
u
ff
e
ri
n
g
 f
ro
m
 c
ar
o
ti
d
 s
te
n
o
si
s 
h
av
e 
a 
st
ro
k
e.
 S
tu
d
ie
s 
sh
o
w
 t
h
at
 
th
e 
ri
sk
 o
f 
st
ro
k
e 
o
r 
d
ea
th
 i
s 
d
ec
re
as
ed
 f
o
r 
p
at
ie
n
ts
 w
h
o
 u
n
d
er
g
o
 s
u
rg
ic
al
 t
re
at
m
en
t.
 
H
o
w
e
v
e
r,
 
e
v
en
 
th
o
u
g
h
 
p
er
i-
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
st
ro
k
e 
o
r 
d
ea
th
 
is
 
in
 
p
ar
t 
in
fl
u
en
ce
d
 
b
y
 
th
e
 
q
u
al
it
y
 
o
f 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
in
 
a 
h
o
sp
it
al
, 
p
at
ie
n
t-
re
la
te
d
 
fa
ct
o
rs
 
su
ch
 
as
 
ag
e,
 
se
ve
ri
ty
 
o
f 
st
en
o
si
s 
et
c.
 a
re
 a
ls
o
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
t.
 F
o
r 
a 
fa
ir
 c
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
 o
f 
h
o
sp
it
al
s,
 t
h
e 
co
n
si
d
er
at
io
n
 
o
f 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
ri
sk
 p
ro
fi
le
s 
o
f 
p
at
ie
n
ts
 i
s 
re
q
u
ir
ed
. 
T
h
u
s,
 a
 r
is
k
-a
d
ju
st
ed
 r
at
e 
o
f 
“p
e
ri
-
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
st
ro
k
e 
o
r 
d
e
at
h
” 
is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d
 u
si
n
g
 l
o
g
is
ti
c 
re
g
re
ss
io
n
. 
 
T
o
ta
l 
K
n
ee
 E
n
d
o
p
ro
st
h
es
is
: 
In
it
ia
l 
im
p
la
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
P
o
st
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
w
o
u
n
d
 i
n
fe
ct
io
n
 
K
N
IE
_
T
E
P
 
(4
7
3
9
0
) 
P
o
st
o
p
e
ra
ti
v
e
 w
o
u
n
d
 i
n
fe
c
ti
o
n
 i
s 
a
n
 i
n
fe
c
ti
o
n
 i
n
 t
h
e
 o
p
e
ra
ti
v
e
 a
re
a
. 
T
h
is
 q
u
a
li
ty
 i
n
d
ic
a
to
r 
in
d
ic
a
te
s 
h
o
w
 
fr
e
q
u
e
n
t 
p
o
st
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
w
o
u
n
d
 
in
fe
ct
io
n
 
is
 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 
to
ta
l 
k
n
ee
 
en
d
o
p
ro
st
h
es
is
 s
u
rg
er
y
. 
R
eo
p
er
at
io
n
s 
(o
r 
re
-
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
s)
 d
u
e 
to
 
co
m
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s 
K
N
IE
_
T
E
P
 
(4
5
0
5
9
) 
U
n
p
la
n
n
e
d
 
re
-o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
s 
a
re
 
d
u
e
 
to
 
c
o
m
p
li
c
a
ti
o
n
s 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 
th
e
 
p
ri
m
a
ry
 
su
rg
e
ry
. 
T
h
e
 
o
ve
ra
ll
 r
a
te
 o
f 
se
c
o
n
d
a
ry
 p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s 
is
 a
n
 i
n
d
ic
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e
 q
u
a
li
ty
 o
f 
a
 h
o
sp
it
a
l.
 
 
 
 
3
1
 
 
T
a
b
le
 1
d
: 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 o
f 
Q
u
a
li
ty
 I
n
d
ic
a
to
rs
 a
n
d
 S
u
m
m
a
ry
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
S
e
rv
ic
e
 A
re
a
 
Q
u
a
li
ty
 I
n
d
ic
a
to
r 
C
o
d
e
 
E
x
p
la
n
a
ti
o
n
 
C
o
ro
n
ar
y
 A
n
g
io
g
ra
p
h
y
 a
n
d
 
P
er
cu
ta
n
eo
u
s 
C
o
ro
n
ar
y
 I
n
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
 
(P
C
I)
 
In
d
ic
at
io
n
 f
o
r 
co
ro
n
a
ry
 
an
g
io
g
ra
p
h
y
: 
Is
ch
e
m
ia
 
sy
m
p
to
m
s 
K
O
R
O
_
P
C
I 
(4
3
7
5
7
) 
T
h
is
 
q
u
a
li
ty
 
in
d
ic
a
to
r 
sh
o
w
s 
th
e
 
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 
o
c
c
u
rr
e
n
c
e
 
o
f 
co
ro
n
ar
y
 
an
g
io
g
ra
p
h
y
 
fo
r 
p
at
ie
n
ts
 w
it
h
 i
sc
h
em
ia
 s
y
m
p
to
m
s.
 
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
P
C
I 
in
 p
at
ie
n
ts
 
w
it
h
o
u
t 
ac
u
te
 c
o
ro
n
ar
y
 
sy
n
d
ro
m
e
 
K
O
R
O
_
P
C
I 
(6
9
8
8
9
) 
T
h
e
 
c
a
rd
io
lo
g
ic
a
l 
so
c
ie
ti
e
s 
re
g
u
la
rl
y
 
p
u
b
li
sh
 
u
p
d
a
te
d
 
g
u
id
e
li
n
e
s 
o
n
 
th
e
 
in
d
ic
a
ti
o
n
s 
fo
r 
c
o
ro
n
a
ry
 
in
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
 
(A
m
e
ri
c
a
n
 
H
e
a
rt
 
A
ss
o
c
ia
ti
o
n
, 
A
m
e
ri
c
a
n
 
C
o
ll
e
g
e
 
o
f 
C
a
rd
io
lo
g
y
, 
S
o
c
ie
ty
 
fo
r 
C
a
rd
io
va
sc
u
la
r 
A
n
g
io
g
ra
p
h
y
 
a
n
d
 
In
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
s,
 
E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
 
S
o
c
ie
ty
 
o
f 
C
a
rd
io
lo
g
y
).
 T
h
is
 q
u
a
li
ty
 i
n
d
ic
a
to
r 
re
fe
rs
 t
o
 t
h
e
 p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
c
a
se
s 
in
 w
h
ic
h
 t
h
e
 g
u
id
e
li
n
e
s 
a
re
 n
o
t 
fo
ll
o
w
e
d
 f
o
r 
in
d
ic
a
ti
o
n
s 
fo
r 
p
a
ti
e
n
ts
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
ac
u
te
 c
o
ro
n
ar
y
 s
y
n
d
ro
m
e.
 
A
ch
ie
v
in
g
 t
h
e 
m
ai
n
 o
b
je
ct
iv
e 
o
f 
 p
er
cu
ta
n
eo
u
s 
co
ro
n
ar
y
 
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
 
K
O
R
O
_
P
C
I 
(6
9
8
9
1
) 
P
e
rc
u
ta
n
e
o
u
s 
C
o
ro
n
a
ry
 I
n
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
 (
P
C
I)
 i
s 
a
 t
h
e
ra
p
e
u
ti
c
 p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
 t
o
 o
p
e
n
 n
ar
ro
w
e
d
 o
r 
b
lo
c
k
e
d
 c
o
ro
n
a
ry
 a
rt
e
ri
e
s.
 T
h
e
 m
a
in
 o
b
je
c
ti
ve
 o
f 
in
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
 i
n
 P
C
I 
is
 d
e
fi
n
e
d
 a
s 
“
h
a
v
in
g
 
a
n
 a
n
g
io
g
ra
p
h
ic
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 o
f 
5
0
 %
 i
n
 d
il
a
te
d
 s
e
g
m
e
n
ts
”
. 
B
re
as
t 
S
u
rg
er
y
 
H
o
rm
o
n
e 
re
ce
p
to
r 
an
al
y
si
s 
M
A
M
M
A
 
(4
6
2
0
1
) 
R
e
c
e
p
to
r 
a
n
a
ly
si
s 
is
 a
 d
ia
g
n
o
st
ic
 t
e
st
 t
o
 d
e
te
rm
in
e
 b
io
lo
g
ic
a
l 
c
h
a
ra
c
te
ri
st
ic
s 
o
f 
c
e
ll
s 
in
 a
 
tu
m
o
r 
a
n
d
 t
h
e
ir
 r
e
sp
o
n
se
s 
to
 g
ro
w
th
 f
a
c
to
rs
. 
In
 b
re
a
st
 c
a
n
c
er
 c
a
se
s,
 t
h
is
 a
n
a
ly
si
s 
re
q
u
ir
e
 a
 
te
c
h
n
iq
u
e
 
c
a
ll
e
d
 
im
m
u
n
o
c
y
to
c
h
e
m
is
tr
y
, 
a
n
d
 
th
e
 
o
u
tc
o
m
e
 
o
f 
th
is
 
te
st
 
is
 
u
se
d
 
to
 
d
e
c
id
e
 
w
h
e
th
e
r 
a
 w
o
m
a
n
 w
it
h
 b
re
a
st
 c
a
n
c
e
r 
sh
o
u
ld
 b
e
 t
re
a
te
d
 w
it
h
 a
n
ti
-e
st
ro
g
e
n
s.
 
D
o
cu
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
m
ar
g
in
s 
o
f 
re
se
ct
io
n
 
M
A
M
M
A
 
(6
8
1
0
0
) 
“
M
a
rg
in
s 
o
f 
re
se
c
ti
o
n
”
 i
s 
th
e
 d
is
ta
n
c
e
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 a
 t
u
m
o
r 
a
n
d
 t
h
e
 e
d
g
e
 o
f 
th
e
 s
u
rr
o
u
n
d
in
g
 
ti
ss
u
e
 r
e
m
o
v
e
d
 a
lo
n
g
 w
it
h
 i
t.
 W
h
e
n
 a
 b
re
a
st
 t
u
m
o
r 
is
 r
e
m
o
ve
d
, 
so
m
e
 t
is
su
e
 s
u
rr
o
u
n
d
in
g
 i
t 
is
 a
ls
o
 r
e
m
o
v
e
d
. 
A
 p
a
th
o
lo
g
is
t 
th
e
n
 c
h
e
c
k
s 
th
e
 t
is
su
e
 u
n
d
e
r 
a
 m
ic
ro
sc
o
p
e
 t
o
 s
e
e
 
if
 t
h
e
 
m
a
rg
in
s 
a
re
 f
re
e 
o
f 
c
a
n
c
e
r 
c
e
ll
s.
 K
n
o
w
in
g
 t
h
e
 c
lo
se
n
e
ss
 o
f 
c
a
n
c
e
r 
c
e
ll
s 
to
 t
h
e
 e
d
g
e
 o
f 
th
e
 
re
m
o
ve
d
 t
is
su
e
 h
e
lp
s 
in
 d
e
te
rm
in
in
g
 t
h
e
 r
ig
h
t 
tr
e
a
tm
e
n
t 
d
e
c
is
io
n
 (
e
.g
.,
 w
h
e
th
e
r 
a
d
d
it
io
n
a
l 
su
rg
e
ry
 i
s 
n
e
e
d
e
d
).
  
 
 
 
3
2
 
 
T
a
b
le
 1
e:
 D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 o
f 
Q
u
a
li
ty
 I
n
d
ic
a
to
rs
 a
n
d
 S
u
m
m
a
ry
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
S
er
v
ic
e 
A
re
a
 
Q
u
a
li
ty
 I
n
d
ic
a
to
r 
C
o
d
e 
In
p
u
t 
o
r 
O
u
tp
u
t 
M
ea
su
re
 
H
ig
h
 
S
co
re
 
M
ea
n
in
g
 
O
b
s.
 
M
ea
n
 
S
td
. 
D
ev
. 
C
h
o
le
cy
st
ec
to
m
y
 
C
o
ll
ec
ti
o
n
 o
f 
h
is
to
lo
g
ic
al
 f
in
d
in
g
s 
C
H
O
L
 (
4
4
8
0
0
) 
IN
P
U
T
 
H
IG
H
 
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
 
2
2
3
8
 
9
8
.6
2
 
5
.9
2
 
R
e-
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
 r
at
e
 
C
H
O
L
 (
4
4
9
2
7
) 
O
U
T
P
U
T
 
L
O
W
  
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
 
2
1
9
1
 
1
.1
6
 
3
.4
0
 
O
b
st
et
ri
cs
 
P
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
p
ed
ia
tr
ic
ia
n
 f
o
r 
p
re
m
at
u
re
 i
n
fa
n
ts
 
G
E
B
H
 (
7
3
7
) 
IN
P
U
T
 
H
IG
H
 
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
 
1
3
0
7
 
6
7
.2
2
 
3
9
.4
6
 
P
re
n
at
al
 c
o
rt
ic
o
st
er
o
id
 t
h
er
ap
y
: 
in
 c
as
e 
o
f 
b
ir
th
s 
w
it
h
 a
 
g
es
ta
ti
o
n
al
 a
g
e 
o
f 
2
4
+
0
-3
4
+
0
 w
ee
k
s 
(e
x
cl
u
d
in
g
 s
ti
ll
b
ir
th
s)
 
an
d
 b
ir
th
s 
w
it
h
 a
 p
re
n
at
al
 h
o
sp
it
al
 s
ta
y
 o
f 
at
 l
ea
st
 t
w
o
 
ca
le
n
d
ar
 d
a
y
s 
G
E
B
H
 (
4
9
5
2
3
) 
IN
P
U
T
 
H
IG
H
 
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
 
7
9
8
 
6
9
.3
9
 
3
9
.5
7
 
E
-E
-t
im
e 
in
 e
m
er
g
en
c
y
 c
ae
sa
re
an
 c
as
es
 
G
E
B
H
 (
8
2
9
1
3
) 
IN
P
U
T
 
H
IG
H
 
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
 
1
3
9
0
 
9
2
.5
0
 
2
0
.8
7
 
G
y
n
ec
o
lo
g
ic
al
 S
u
rg
er
y
 
A
n
ti
b
io
ti
c 
p
ro
p
h
y
la
x
is
  
in
 h
y
st
er
ec
to
m
y
 c
as
es
 
G
Y
N
_
O
P
 (
4
7
6
3
7
) 
IN
P
U
T
 
H
IG
H
 
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
 
1
8
0
2
 
9
1
.1
0
 
1
7
.9
9
 
T
h
ro
m
b
o
p
ro
p
h
y
la
x
is
  
in
 h
y
st
e
re
c
to
m
y
 c
a
se
s 
G
Y
N
_
O
P
 (
5
0
5
5
4
) 
IN
P
U
T
 
H
IG
H
 
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
 
1
8
3
8
 
9
8
.1
3
 
9
.7
5
 
P
ac
e
m
ak
er
 
Im
p
la
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
G
u
id
el
in
e 
co
n
fo
rm
it
y
 i
n
d
ic
at
io
n
 f
o
r 
b
ra
d
y
d
y
sr
h
y
th
m
ia
 
H
S
M
_
IM
P
L
 (
9
9
6
2
) 
IN
P
U
T
 
H
IG
H
 
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
 
1
7
7
8
 
9
2
.1
0
 
1
1
.6
1
 
G
u
id
el
in
e 
co
n
fo
rm
it
y
 s
y
st
e
m
 c
h
o
ic
e 
in
 b
ra
d
y
d
y
sr
h
y
th
m
ia
 
ca
se
s 
H
S
M
_
IM
P
L
 (
7
5
9
7
3
) 
IN
P
U
T
 
H
IG
H
 
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
 
1
8
1
7
 
9
2
.9
3
 
1
0
.5
8
 
P
er
i-
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
co
m
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s:
 S
u
rg
ic
al
 c
o
m
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s 
H
S
M
_
IM
P
L
 (
1
1
2
5
5
) 
O
U
T
P
U
T
 
L
O
W
 
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
 
1
8
5
5
 
1
.3
0
 
3
.4
6
 
P
er
io
p
er
at
iv
e 
co
m
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s:
 C
at
h
et
er
 d
is
lo
ca
ti
o
n
 i
n
 a
tr
iu
m
 
H
S
M
_
IM
P
L
 (
1
1
2
6
4
) 
O
U
T
P
U
T
 
L
O
W
 
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
 
1
8
5
2
 
2
.0
7
 
4
.2
5
 
P
er
io
p
er
at
iv
e 
co
m
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s:
 C
at
h
et
er
 d
is
lo
ca
ti
o
n
 i
n
 
v
en
tr
ic
le
 
H
S
M
_
IM
P
L
 (
1
1
2
6
5
) 
O
U
T
P
U
T
 
L
O
W
 
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
 
1
8
8
5
 
1
.4
6
 
3
.1
3
 
 
 
 
3
3
 
 
T
a
b
le
 1
f:
 D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 o
f 
Q
u
a
li
ty
 I
n
d
ic
a
to
rs
 a
n
d
 S
u
m
m
a
ry
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
(C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
) 
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
A
re
a
 
Q
u
a
li
ty
 I
n
d
ic
a
to
r 
C
o
d
e 
In
p
u
t 
o
r 
O
u
tp
u
t 
M
ea
su
re
 
H
ig
h
 S
co
re
 
M
ea
n
in
g
 
O
b
s.
 
M
ea
n
 
S
td
. 
D
ev
. 
H
ip
 E
n
d
o
p
ro
st
h
es
is
: 
In
it
ia
l 
Im
p
la
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
E
n
d
o
p
ro
st
h
es
is
 d
is
lo
ca
ti
o
n
 
H
U
F
T
-T
E
P
 (
4
5
0
1
3
) 
O
U
T
P
U
T
 
L
O
W
 
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
 
2
1
6
7
 
1
.0
2
 
5
.1
1
 
P
o
st
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
w
o
u
n
d
 i
n
fe
ct
io
n
 
H
U
F
T
-T
E
P
 (
4
5
1
0
8
) 
O
U
T
P
U
T
 
L
O
W
 
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
 
2
1
6
0
 
1
.1
3
 
4
.2
3
 
R
eo
p
er
at
io
n
s 
(o
r 
re
-i
n
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
s)
 d
u
e 
to
 
co
m
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s 
H
U
F
T
-T
E
P
 (
4
5
0
5
9
) 
O
U
T
P
U
T
 
L
O
W
 
Q
U
A
L
IT
Y
 
1
8
7
8
 
1
.9
1
 
3
.9
0
 
C
ar
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Table 4a: Documentation Rates in Service Areas across Years 
Documentation Rates in Service Areas Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
2006 
Cholecystectomy  1217 97.32 11.68 0 100 
Obstetrics  897 96.96 14.82 0 100 
Gynecological Surgery 1140 94.38 17.78 0 100 
Pacemaker Implantation  1019 95.28 15.06 0 100 
Hip Endoprosthesis 1168 96.21 14.97 0 100 
Carotid Reconstruction 527 90.46 25.23 0 100 
Total Knee Endoprosthesis 1000 96.40 15.65 0 100 
Breast Surgery 1072 92.09 20.51 0 100 
Coronary Angiography and Percutaneous Coronary 
Intervention (PCI) 
742 87.90 28.25 0 100 
2008 
Cholecystectomy  1151 96.83 12.11 0 100 
Obstetrics  814 98.30 9.60 0 100 
Gynecological Surgery 1114 94.02 19.39 0 100 
Pacemaker Implantation  1006 94.54 17.04 0 100 
Hip Endoprosthesis 1105 97.68 8.68 0 100 
Carotid Reconstruction 530 93.88 19.14 0 100 
Total Knee Endoprosthesis 973 97.74 10.07 0 100 
Breast Surgery 1015 89.88 22.96 0 100 
Coronary Angiography and Percutaneous Coronary 
Intervention (PCI) 
854 85.42 32.05 0 100 
3
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Table 5: Average Percentage of Hospitals with Documentation Errors in Various Service Areas in 2008 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
CHOL (44800) 1142 0.006 0.078 
CHOL (44927) 1138 0.007 0.084 
GEBH (737) 808 0.026 0.159 
GEBH (49523) 808 0.033 0.159 
GEBH (82913) 808 0.009 0.093 
GYN_OP (47637) 1080 0.016 0.125 
GYN_OP (50554) 1079 0.006 0.074 
HSM_IMPL (11255) 992 0.000 0.000 
HSM_IMPL (11264) 992 0.002 0.045 
HSM_IMPL (11265) 992 0.001 0.032 
HSM_IMPL (75973) 992 0.010 0.100 
HSM_IMPL (9962) 992 0.014 0.118 
HUFT-TEP (45013) 1104 0.000 0.000 
HUFT-TEP (45059) 1104 0.001 0.030 
HUFT-TEP (45108) 1104 0.003 0.052 
KAROT (9556) 515 0.017 0.131 
KAROT (68415) 519 0.006 0.076 
KNIE_TEP (45059) 972 0.001 0.032 
KNIE_TEP (47390) 972 0.006 0.078 
MAMMA (46201) 982 0.007 0.084 
MAMMA (68100) 978 0.041 0.198 
KORO_PCI (43757) 781 0.003 0.051 
KORO_PCI (69889) 763 0.009 0.095 
KORO_PCI (69891) 763 0.003 0.051 
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Table 6a: Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Input (Process) Quality Measures  
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES CHOL (44800) 
YEAR 08 2.7333*** -0.0155 -1.2204***  0.1489 
 (0.536) (0.110) (0.337)  (0.225) 
CONSTANT 95.8671*** 99.0617*** 99.9803***  98.6388*** 
 (0.257) (0.053) (0.161)  (0.108) 
Observations 573 520 1,020  2,113 
VARIABLES GEBH (737) 
YEAR 08 34.0712*** 8.2292*** 1.0758 -18.7797*** 5.2786*** 
 (4.275) (2.640) (0.723) (3.049) (1.611) 
CONSTANT 7.0928*** 67.8646*** 93.3424*** 99.6652*** 67.0483*** 
 (1.636) (1.184) (0.339) (1.330) (0.700) 
Observations 34.0712*** 8.2292*** 1.0758 -18.7797*** 5.2786*** 
VARIABLES GEBH (49523) 
YEAR 08 81.2619*** 35.7666*** -0.3388  14.9015*** 
 (7.904) (3.445) (1.475)  (2.194) 
CONSTANT 0.0000 51.1146*** 93.5097***  62.3444*** 
 (0.954) (1.373) (0.611)  (0.743) 
Observations 174 133 396  703 
VARIABLES GEBH (82913) 
YEAR 08 30.0357*** -2.5129***   5.2626*** 
 (3.089) (0.491)   (1.019) 
CONSTANT 59.6964*** 99.9199***   90.0460*** 
 (1.277) (0.211)   (0.433) 
Observations 312 959   1,271 
VARIABLES GYN_OP (47637) 
YEAR 08 23.9770*** 1.0717** -1.8660*** -2.4786*** 5.1620*** 
 (2.017) (0.464) (0.474) (0.695) (0.676) 
CONSTANT 62.0699*** 94.1059*** 98.2650*** 99.9029*** 88.5454*** 
 (0.934) (0.222) (0.226) (0.311) (0.316) 
Observations 404 420 422 375 1,621 
VARIABLES GYN_OP (50554) 
YEAR 08 5.5562*** -0.4212***   1.1562*** 
 (1.254) (0.078)   (0.348) 
CONSTANT 91.0629*** 99.8227***   97.4971*** 
 (0.583) (0.037)   (0.163) 
Observations 450 1,245   1,695 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
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Table 6b: Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Input (Process) Quality Measures 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (75973) 
YEAR 08 13.2030*** 2.5791*** -0.0506 -4.3639*** 3.0149*** 
 (1.301) (0.454) (0.383) (0.923) (0.483) 
CONSTANT 78.1935*** 92.0619*** 96.2442*** 99.7406*** 91.4132*** 
 (0.627) (0.219) (0.186) (0.433) (0.232) 
Observations 415 400 420 384 1,619 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (9962) 
YEAR 08 24.0877*** 7.3877*** 1.8858*** -1.9354*** 7.8762*** 
 (1.464) (0.324) (0.362) (0.376) (0.536) 
CONSTANT 69.7561*** 88.7884*** 94.0155*** 98.7591*** 87.7753*** 
 (0.692) (0.158) (0.175) (0.177) (0.256) 
Observations 387 386 393 376 1,542 
VARIABLES KAROT (9556) 
YEAR 08 20.5810*** 0.0990 -6.6500***  2.3102** 
 (2.609) (0.886) (1.053)  (1.042) 
CONSTANT 68.8936*** 91.8447*** 99.1531***  89.4595*** 
 (1.225) (0.433) (0.470)  (0.483) 
Observations 213 215 399  827 
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (43757) 
YEAR 08 14.6009*** 2.0206*** -1.0375** -4.7327*** 2.8610*** 
 (1.838) (0.444) (0.443) (0.938) (0.625) 
CONSTANT 73.1508*** 90.0059*** 94.8829*** 99.3416*** 89.2376*** 
 (0.870) (0.217) (0.205) (0.431) (0.294) 
Observations 279 285 273 270 1,107 
VARIABLES MAMMA (46201) 
YEAR 08 14.7479*** 1.1658** -2.9870***  2.2378*** 
 (2.036) (0.533) (0.662)  (0.642) 
CONSTANT 74.3684*** 97.2185*** 99.7553***  92.9765*** 
 (0.881) (0.255) (0.299)  (0.292) 
Observations 386 426 793  1,605 
VARIABLES MAMMA (68100) 
YEAR 08 36.1376*** 6.2795*** -7.1564***  6.2658*** 
 (2.769) (1.096) (1.111)  (1.092) 
CONSTANT 39.5828*** 84.2342*** 98.7077***  80.5248*** 
 (1.122) (0.536) (0.496)  (0.489) 
Observations 348 395 703  1,446 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
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Table 7a: Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Output Quality Measures 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (69891) 
YEAR 08 29.0208*** 2.0822*** -0.5516* -3.6827*** 4.8646*** 
 (4.418) (0.385) (0.312) (0.642) (1.011) 
CONSTANT 48.3229*** 91.3836*** 95.3277*** 99.6300*** 84.9487*** 
 (1.568) (0.185) (0.148) (0.260) (0.439) 
Observations 186 233 229 200 848 
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (69889) 
YEAR 08 -10.5733*** 0.3132 0.5605** 3.0276*** -2.0256*** 
 (2.016) (0.320) (0.213) (1.134) (0.710) 
CONSTANT 16.7353*** 3.8638*** 1.2355*** 4.44E-16 5.5936*** 
 (0.963) (0.154) (0.101) (0.410) (0.313) 
Observations 222 221 132 271 846 
VARIABLES CHOL (44927) 
YEAR 08 -2.9400*** -0.1172 0.3484** 1.0403*** -0.2439 
 (0.585) (0.075) (0.128) (0.081) (0.157) 
CONSTANT 4.0204*** 1.1498*** 0.5123*** -9.99E-16 1.2934*** 
 (0.277) (0.037) (0.061) (0.039) (0.075) 
Observations 509 512 65 977 -0.2439 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (11255) 
YEAR 08 -3.0279*** -0.2540  1.2100*** -0.1168 
 (0.306) (0.157)  (0.246) (0.174) 
CONSTANT 4.7162*** 1.2061***  0.0000 1.3815*** 
 (0.149) (0.075)  (0.117) (0.083) 
Observations 417 296  969 1,682 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (11264) 
YEAR 08 -4.2822*** -0.1555  1.7416*** -0.0250 
 (0.406) (0.187)  (0.184) (0.178) 
CONSTANT 7.3159*** 1.5387***  2.22E-16 2.0322*** 
 (0.195) (0.089)  (0.088) (0.085) 
Observations 421 233  1,038 1,692 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (11265) 
YEAR 08 -2.8148*** -0.2078*  1.3037*** 0.0270 
 (0.330) (0.110)  (0.135) (0.131) 
CONSTANT 4.8772*** 1.1552***  -2.22E-16 1.4042*** 
 (0.159) (0.052)  (0.065) (0.063) 
Observations 435 270  1,028 1,733 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
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Table 7b: Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Output Quality Measures 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES HUFT_TEP (45013) 
YEAR 08 -2.8908*** -0.1866***  0.8123*** -0.2320 
 (0.497) (0.047)  (0.144) (0.149) 
CONSTANT 3.9800*** 0.6236***  1.67E-16 1.0259*** 
 (0.239) (0.023)  (0.068) (0.071) 
Observations 465 395  1,184 2,044 
VARIABLES HUFT_TEP (45059) 
YEAR 08 -4.0570*** -0.8812*** 0.5021*** 2.4773*** -0.5832*** 
 (0.326) (0.144) (0.124) (0.400) (0.155) 
CONSTANT 7.6716*** 3.1042*** 1.4167*** 0.0229 3.0986*** 
 (0.159) (0.069) (0.059) (0.182) (0.074) 
Observations 517 504 504 494 2,019 
VARIABLES HUFT_TEP (45108) 
YEAR 08 -3.0488*** -0.0302  0.8377*** -0.3762*** 
 (0.463) (0.064)  (0.096) (0.138) 
CONSTANT 4.2763*** 0.7936***  -5.55E-17 1.2662*** 
 (0.227) (0.031)  (0.045) (0.066) 
Observations 506 506  1,014 2,026 
VARIABLES KAROT (68415) 
YEAR 08 -6.9383*** 0.6170**  2.9187*** -0.2583 
 (1.660) (0.284)  (0.363) (0.517) 
CONSTANT 9.9383*** 2.0520***  6.66E-16 3.0461*** 
 (0.809) (0.136)  (0.167) (0.244) 
Observations 371 196  193 762 
VARIABLES KNIE_TEP (45059) 
YEAR 08 -2.6448*** -0.2585 0.1190 1.1731*** -0.3922*** 
 (0.220) (0.472) (0.077) (0.131) (0.150) 
CONSTANT 5.3194*** 2.1915*** 1.0129*** 5.55E-16 2.1087*** 
 (0.106) (0.230) (0.037) (0.060) (0.071) 
Observations 434 445 370 486 1,735 
VARIABLES KNIE_TEP (47390) 
YEAR 08 -1.3880*** -0.1040*  0.6269*** 0.0326 
 (0.188) (0.060)  (0.203) (0.135) 
CONSTANT 2.5234*** 0.5616***  2.78E-16 0.6755*** 
 (0.091) (0.029)  (0.095) (0.064) 
Observations 407 258  1,070 1,735 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
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Table 8a: Change in Quality Scores across Different Organizational Forms for Process (Input) Quality 
Measures 
VARIABLES 
CHOL 
(44800) 
GEBH (737) 
GEBH 
(49523) 
GEBH 
(82913) 
GYN_OP 
(47637) 
GYN_OP 
(50554) 
PUBLIC -2.0913 -11.3779 29.7971 -22.4912 -1.0895 0.6299 
 
(1.506) (11.300) (37.384) (19.535) (3.181) (0.834) 
PRIVATE -1.2648 -9.8127 15.4414 -11.2858 5.5150 1.3908 
 
(1.234) (13.366) (33.208) (17.691) (6.064) (1.439) 
YEAR 08 0.1900 1.1066 15.5807*** 7.1125*** 4.2909*** 1.6165*** 
 
(0.331) (2.751) (4.047) (1.616) (0.985) (0.599) 
PUBLIC * YEAR 08 0.1939 8.5708** -2.4292 -3.8075* 1.5575 -0.6155 
 
(0.423) (3.446) (4.758) (2.181) (1.462) (0.809) 
PRIVATE * YEAR 08 -0.8205 0.6428 7.2451 -3.6209 0.8562 -1.3579* 
 
(1.008) (5.980) (8.902) (2.515) (2.155) (0.799) 
CONSTANT 99.5683*** 71.1632*** 47.0125** 101.5269*** 88.0971*** 97.0684*** 
  (0.759) (5.353) (21.429) (10.332) (1.665) (0.590) 
Observations 2,238 1,307 798 1,390 1,802 1,838 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð Nonprofit hospitals are excluded as the base group. 
 
Table 8b: Change in Quality Scores across Different Organizational Forms for Process (Input) Quality 
Measures 
VARIABLES 
HSM_IMPL 
(75973) 
HSM_IMPL 
(9962) 
KAROT 
(9556) 
KORO_PCI 
(43757) 
MAMMA 
(46201) 
MAMMA 
(68100) 
PUBLIC 5.4723 2.4611 4.8358 1.0452 -1.3813 -10.3059** 
 
(4.186) (4.282) (6.951) (2.564) (2.134) (4.688) 
PRIVATE -3.9990 6.6807* 4.2773 0.6065 -5.8235* 1.5228 
 
(4.786) (3.881) (6.904) (2.290) (3.158) (5.896) 
YEAR 08 3.1730*** 7.8728*** 2.7789 4.4990*** 1.5855** 6.2821*** 
 
(0.743) (0.758) (1.701) (1.083) (0.803) (1.684) 
PUBLIC * YEAR 08 -0.2272 0.3800 -1.4131 -3.3447** 0.6557 -0.5071 
 
(1.033) (1.138) (2.363) (1.439) (1.361) (2.383) 
PRIVATE * YEAR 08 -0.1152 -1.4353 1.2926 -0.6727 2.8228 1.1868 
 
(1.425) (1.839) (2.680) (1.627) (2.151) (3.441) 
CONSTANT 89.5045*** 85.8492*** 85.8567*** 88.6033*** 93.8397*** 84.5017*** 
  (1.367) (2.021) (4.193) (1.369) (1.259) (2.277) 
Observations 1,816 1,777 917 1,302 1,751 1,623 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð Nonprofit hospitals are excluded as the base group. 
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Table 9a: Change in Quality Scores across Different Organizational Forms for Output Quality Measures 
VARIABLES 
KORO_PCI 
(69891) 
KORO_PCI 
(69889) 
CHOL 
(44927) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11255) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11264) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11265) 
PUBLIC 2.6545 0.4929 0.2611 -4.6093 0.4892 0.5596 
 
(3.744) (1.509) (0.609) (4.445) (1.494) (0.814) 
PRIVATE 3.4157 0.9939 -0.4602 3.4128 0.4656 -0.1660 
 
(2.789) (1.764) (0.658) (3.853) (1.805) (0.742) 
YEAR 08 5.1687*** -2.0099* -0.3090 -0.4215* 0.0032 0.0079 
 
(1.862) (1.152) (0.249) (0.217) (0.277) (0.222) 
PUBLIC * 
YEAR 08 
1.1501 0.6145 0.0667 0.5149* -0.1925 -0.0249 
(2.440) (1.577) (0.367) (0.273) (0.398) (0.294) 
PRIVATE * 
YEAR 08 
-5.0087** -1.7592 0.3017 0.4428 0.3956 0.2481 
(2.156) (2.176) (0.319) (0.525) (0.470) (0.376) 
CONSTANT 83.8166*** 5.3922*** 1.2488*** 2.8772* 1.8036** 1.2293*** 
  (2.195) (0.774) (0.292) (1.546) (0.862) (0.405) 
Observations 993 1,009 2,191 1,854 1,852 1,884 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð Nonprofit hospitals are excluded as the base group. 
 
Table 9b: Change in Quality Scores across Different Organizational Forms for Output Quality Measures 
VARIABLES 
HUFT_TEP 
(45013) 
HUFT_TEP 
(45059) 
HUFT_TEP 
(45108) 
KAROT 
(68415) 
KNIE_TEP 
(45059) 
KNIE_TEP 
(47390) 
PUBLIC 0.3553 1.2603 1.5534 2.9428* -2.3923** 0.3553 
 
(0.284) (0.805) (0.972) (1.618) (0.953) (0.284) 
PRIVATE -0.0436 -0.1408 1.0948 1.3866 -2.3287** -0.0436 
 
(0.305) (0.637) (0.978) (1.532) (1.133) (0.305) 
YEAR 08 -0.1882 -0.2741 -0.1719 0.5947 -0.6299*** -0.1882 
 
(0.318) (0.301) (0.136) (0.549) (0.137) (0.318) 
PUBLIC * 
YEAR 08 
-0.1796 -0.5633 -0.2841 -2.0294* 0.4205 -0.1796 
(0.352) (0.357) (0.214) (1.126) (0.365) (0.352) 
PRIVATE * 
YEAR 08 
0.1782 -0.4089 -0.5227 0.7048 0.4156* 0.1782 
(0.350) (0.420) (0.677) (0.893) (0.226) (0.350) 
CONSTANT 0.9994*** 2.8471*** 0.5120 1.5135* 3.5020*** 0.9994*** 
  (0.189) (0.409) (0.474) (0.790) (0.560) (0.189) 
Observations 2,166 2,155 2,159 915 1,877 1,877 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð Nonprofit hospitals are excluded as the base group. 
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Table 10a: Change in Quality Scores across Teaching Status for Process (Input) Quality Measures 
VARIABLES 
CHOL 
(44800) 
GEBH 
(737) 
GEBH 
(49523) 
GEBH 
(82513) 
GYN_OP 
(47637) 
GYN_OP 
(50554) 
YEAR 08 -0.0594 3.7360 19.9955*** 6.4496*** 5.5330*** 1.1385** 
 (0.326) (2.679) (4.165) (1.534) (0.996) (0.472) 
ACADEMIC * YEAR 08 0.5298 3.0605 -7.8218 -2.5335 -0.8832 0.0422 
 (0.425) (3.230) (4.857) (2.011) (1.302) (0.696) 
CONSTANT 98.5436*** 64.5957*** 63.1117*** 90.0001*** 88.4110*** 97.5452*** 
 (0.115) (0.823) (0.917) (0.484) (0.354) (0.177) 
Observations 2,238 1,307 798 1,390 1,802 1,838 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 10b: Change in Quality Scores across Teaching Status for Process (Input) Quality Measures 
VARIABLES 
HSM_IMPL 
(75973) 
HSM_IMPL 
(9962) 
KAROT 
(9556) 
KORO_PCI 
(43757) 
MAMMA 
(46201) 
MAMMA 
(68100) 
YEAR 08 3.2411*** 9.1933*** 2.3482 3.8611*** 2.5911** 5.0699*** 
 (0.705) (0.807) (1.777) (1.005) (1.097) (1.750) 
ACADEMIC * YEAR 08 -0.5217 -3.0470*** -0.0602 -2.0039 -0.7733 2.5832 
 (0.944) (1.023) (2.192) (1.247) (1.215) (2.119) 
CONSTANT 91.3145*** 87.7850*** 88.7833*** 89.1820*** 92.4032*** 80.3127*** 
 (0.259) (0.292) (0.539) (0.346) (0.327) (0.562) 
Observations 1,817 1,778 917 1,302 1,751 1,623 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 11a: Change in Quality Scores across Teaching Status for Output Quality Measures 
VARIABLES 
KORO_PCI 
(69891) 
KORO_PCI 
(69889) 
CHOL 
(44927) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11255) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11264) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11265) 
YEAR 08 6.3609*** -4.1073*** -0.3831 -0.0442 -0.1224 -0.0047 
 (1.950) (1.410) (0.257) (0.286) (0.277) (0.198) 
ACADEMIC * YEAR 08 -2.3432 3.4206** 0.3449 -0.1652 0.2147 0.0709 
 (2.255) (1.583) (0.270) (0.325) (0.345) (0.257) 
CONSTANT 85.5052*** 5.8469*** 1.2888*** 1.3647*** 2.0841*** 1.4495*** 
 (0.537) (0.388) (0.081) (0.092) (0.094) (0.069) 
Observations 993 1,009 2,191 1,855 1,852 1,885 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 11b: Change in Quality Scores across Teaching Status for Output Quality Measures 
VARIABLES 
HUFT_TEP 
(45013) 
HUFT_TEP 
(45059) 
HUFT_TEP 
(45108) 
KAROT 
(68415) 
KNIE_TEP 
(45059) 
KNIE_TEP 
(47390) 
YEAR 08 -0.0090 -0.3727* -0.3761* -0.1451 -0.5172*** -0.0090 
 (0.155) (0.212) (0.212) (0.775) (0.112) (0.155) 
ACADEMIC * YEAR 08 -0.5576* -0.5238* -0.0005 -0.1796 0.3078 -0.5576* 
 (0.328) (0.307) (0.253) (1.033) (0.348) (0.328) 
CONSTANT 1.1327*** 3.3275*** 1.3191*** 3.1043*** 2.1132*** 1.1327*** 
 (0.075) (0.080) (0.071) (0.289) (0.077) (0.075) 
Observations 2,167 2,156 2,160 915 1,878 1,878 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 12a: Change in Quality Scores across Hospital Size for Process (Input) Quality Measures (Number 
of Beds / 100) 
 
VARIABLES 
CHOL 
(44800) 
GEBH 
(737) 
GEBH 
(49523) 
GEBH 
(82513) 
GYN_OP 
(47637) 
GYN_OP 
(50554) 
YEAR 08 -0.0044 5.9082** 18.0732*** 8.2932*** 5.7003*** 1.2893*** 
 (0.398) (2.889) (4.410) (1.680) (1.161) (0.479) 
BEDS 06 * YEAR 08 0.0431 -0.1269 -0.4797 -0.6857*** -0.1110 -0.0346 
 (0.055) (0.318) (0.424) (0.205) (0.192) (0.065) 
CONSTANT 98.5407*** 64.3856*** 62.7898*** 89.8910*** 88.3731*** 97.5398*** 
 (0.116) (0.862) (0.980) (0.495) (0.354) (0.178) 
Observations 2,230 1,301 792 1,384 1,796 1,833 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 12b: Change in Quality Scores across Hospital Size for Process (Input) Quality Measures (Number 
of Beds / 100) 
 
VARIABLES 
HSM_IMPL 
(75973) 
HSM_IMPL 
(9962) 
 
KAROT 
(9556) 
KORO_PCI 
(43757) 
MAMMA 
(46201) 
MAMMA 
(68100) 
YEAR 08 2.6415*** 8.8870***  3.8929** 3.6655*** 2.7157** 5.1062*** 
 (0.818) (0.906)  (1.928) (1.054) (1.179) (1.952) 
BEDS 06 * YEAR 08 0.0949 -0.2590*  -0.2868 -0.1769 -0.1170 0.2777 
 (0.109) (0.157)  (0.240) (0.123) (0.146) (0.281) 
CONSTANT 91.3235*** 87.7655***  88.7405*** 89.1514*** 92.4126*** 80.3116*** 
 (0.266) (0.296)  (0.551) (0.357) (0.334) (0.572) 
Observations 1,812 1,773  914 1,299 1,747 1,620 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 13a: Change in Quality Scores across Hospital Size for Output Quality Measures (Number of Beds 
/ 100) 
 
VARIABLES 
KORO_PCI 
(69891) 
KORO_PCI 
(69889) 
CHOL 
(44927) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11255) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11264) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11265) 
YEAR 08 7.7873*** -2.9592** -0.4824* -0.0000 -0.1592 -0.0033 
 (1.927) (1.402) (0.255) (0.312) (0.299) (0.222) 
BEDS 06 * YEAR 08 -0.5322*** 0.1754 0.0658** -0.0297 0.0338 0.0077 
 (0.189) (0.153) (0.032) (0.038) (0.039) (0.028) 
CONSTANT 85.4274*** 5.8337*** 1.2929*** 1.3641*** 2.0884*** 1.4493*** 
 (0.557) (0.487) (0.081) (0.095) (0.096) (0.070) 
Observations 990 1,006 2,184 1,850 1,848 1,880 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 13b: Change in Quality Scores across Hospital Size for Output Quality Measures (Number of Beds 
/ 100) 
 
VARIABLES 
HUFT_TEP 
(45013) 
HUFT_TEP 
(45059) 
HUFT_TEP 
(45108) 
KAROT 
(68415) 
KNIE_TEP 
(45059) 
KNIE_TEP 
(47390) 
YEAR 08 -0.1828 -0.2254 -0.2783* -0.5568 -0.4367** -0.0952 
 (0.241) (0.248) (0.149) (0.840) (0.190) (0.165) 
BEDS 06 * YEAR 08 -0.0135 -0.0980** -0.0268 0.0538 0.0120 0.0345* 
 (0.041) (0.046) (0.029) (0.088) (0.033) (0.019) 
CONSTANT 1.1372*** 3.3261*** 1.3186*** 3.1294*** 2.1173*** 0.6714*** 
 (0.076) (0.079) (0.070) (0.300) (0.077) (0.069) 
Observations 2,159 2,148 2,152 911 1,870 1,870 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 14a: How Does the Score for “Presence of Pediatrician in Cases of Premature Infants” Change with 
the Number of Hospitals Providing Care in Obstetrics within a Given Radius? 
 
VARIABLES GEBH (737) 
YEAR 08 5.5629 4.9575* 5.1320** 4.8576** 5.7333** 5.1811** 
(3.557) (2.569) (2.393) (2.310) (2.325) (2.314) 
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 5 KM * YEAR 
08 
22.1865***      
(4.892)      
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 5 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (737)  06 
-0.3118***      
(0.044)      
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 10 KM * YEAR 
08 
 10.4786***     
 (2.458)     
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 10 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (737)  06 
 -0.1433***     
 (0.025)     
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 15 KM * YEAR 
08 
  6.4478***    
  (1.375)    
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 15 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (737)  06 
  -0.0894***    
  (0.015)    
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 20 KM * YEAR 
08 
   4.5217***   
   (0.853)   
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 20 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (737)  06 
   -0.0625***   
   (0.009)   
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 25 KM * YEAR 
08 
    3.2831***  
    (0.630)  
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 25 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (737)  06 
    -0.0478***  
    (0.007)  
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 30 KM * YEAR 
08 
     2.6259*** 
     (0.468) 
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 30 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (737)  06 
     -0.0375*** 
     (0.005) 
CONSTANT 66.5342*** 66.5342*** 66.5342*** 66.5342*** 66.5342*** 66.5342*** 
(0.951) (0.977) (0.988) (0.982) (0.981) (0.973) 
Observations 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 14b: How Does the Score for “Prenatal Corticosteroid Therapy” Change with the Number of 
Hospitals Providing Care in Obstetrics within a Given Radius?  
 
VARIABLES GEBH (49523) 
YEAR 08 19.2676*** 14.4522*** 15.5522*** 16.3746*** 16.8846*** 16.5304*** 
(4.426) (3.267) (3.232) (3.104) (3.139) (3.146) 
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 5 KM * YEAR 08 32.0718***      
(6.311)      
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 5 KM * YEAR 08 
* GEBH (49523)  06 
-0.4722***      
(0.061)      
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 10 KM * YEAR 
08 
 19.5256***     
 (3.508)     
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 10 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (49523)  06 
 -0.2550***     
 (0.037)     
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 15 KM * YEAR 
08 
  11.2593***    
  (2.940)    
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 15 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (49523)  06 
  -0.1490***    
  (0.030)    
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 20 KM * YEAR 
08 
   7.3072***   
   (1.594)   
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 20 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (49523)  06 
   -0.0993***   
   (0.017)   
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 25 KM * YEAR 
08 
    5.4290***  
    (1.197)  
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 25 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (49523)  06 
    -0.0758***  
    (0.013)  
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 30 KM * YEAR 
08 
     4.3389*** 
     (0.963) 
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 30 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (49523) 06 
     -0.0602*** 
     (0.010) 
CONSTANT 61.6457*** 61.6457*** 61.6457*** 61.6457*** 61.6457*** 61.6457*** 
(0.561) (0.607) (0.647) (0.641) (0.634) (0.622) 
Observations 680 680 680 680 680 680 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 14c: How Does the Score for “E-E-Time in Emergency Cases of Caesarean” Change with the 
Number of Hospitals Providing Care in Obstetrics within a Given Radius? 
 
VARIABLES GEBH (82913) 
YEAR 08 1.5675 2.6708** 4.2170*** 3.1025*** 3.9516*** 3.8510*** 
(1.461) (1.068) (1.253) (1.166) (1.262) (1.302) 
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 5 KM * YEAR 08 67.0350***      
(7.392)      
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 5 KM * YEAR 08 
* GEBH (82913)  06 
-0.6986***      
(0.071)      
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 10 KM * YEAR 08  44.8365***     
 (4.492)     
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 10 KM * YEAR 08 
* GEBH (82913)  06 
 -0.4681***     
 (0.046)     
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 15 KM * YEAR 08   24.8847***    
  (4.085)    
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 15 KM * YEAR 08 
* GEBH (82913)  06 
  -0.2631***    
  (0.041)    
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 20 KM * YEAR 08    20.2548***   
   (2.165)   
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 20 KM * YEAR 08 
* GEBH (82913)  06 
   -0.2113***   
   (0.022)   
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 25 KM * YEAR 08     15.0132***  
    (1.869)  
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 25 KM * YEAR 08 
* GEBH (82913)  06 
    -0.1577***  
    (0.019)  
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 30 KM * YEAR 08      10.9340*** 
     (1.244) 
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 30 KM * YEAR 08 
* GEBH (82913)  06 
     -0.1150*** 
     (0.012) 
CONSTANT 89.9988*** 89.9988*** 89.9988*** 89.9988*** 89.9988*** 89.9988*** 
(0.259) (0.293) (0.328) (0.311) (0.317) (0.314) 
Observations 1,245 1,245 1,245 1,245 1,245 1,245 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 15a: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Input (Process) Quality 
Measures (Hospitals for Which Documentation Rate Declined are Excluded) 
 
  1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES  CHOL (44800) 
YEAR 08 2.6518*** 0.0960 -1.4452*** 
 
0.0209 
 
(0.556) (0.096) (0.455) 
 
(0.276) 
CONSTANT 96.0046*** 99.0566*** 99.9851*** 
 
98.6972*** 
 
(0.262) (0.046) (0.214) 
 
(0.139) 
Observations 414 371 762 
 
1,547 
VARIABLES   GEBH (737) 
YEAR 08 34.9151*** 7.5074** 1.9545*** -20.9072*** 5.9755*** 
 
(4.824) (3.351) (0.715) (3.839) (2.036) 
CONSTANT 6.7709** 68.0357*** 93.2597*** 99.6574*** 64.7287*** 
 
(1.827) (1.447) (0.329) (1.634) (0.998) 
Observations 227 176 202 195 800 
VARIABLES GEBH (49523) 
YEAR 08 87.9063*** 34.9059*** -1.2725 
 
15.3333*** 
 
(6.976) (3.582) (1.890) 
 
(2.781) 
CONSTANT 1.78E-15 52.9079*** 93.8865*** 
 
62.2344*** 
 
(0.893) (1.368) (0.764) 
 
(1.123) 
Observations 125 89 272 
 
486 
VARIABLES GEBH (82913) 
YEAR 08 29.8452*** -2.4375*** 
  
5.9879*** 
 
(3.524) (0.629) 
  
(1.268) 
CONSTANT 58.5557*** 99.9237*** 
  
89.1280*** 
 
(1.443) (0.257) 
  
(0.579) 
Observations 232 657 
  
889 
VARIABLES   GYN_OP (47637) 
YEAR 08 26.8275*** 1.3653*** -1.5717*** -2.9508*** 5.8969*** 
 
(2.487) (0.496) (0.502) (0.958) (0.849) 
CONSTANT 59.9668*** 94.2443*** 98.2681*** 99.9156*** 88.0919*** 
 
(1.130) (0.235) (0.235) (0.418) (0.439) 
Observations 295 304 312 275 1,186 
 VARIABLES  GYN_OP (50554) 
YEAR 08 5.5653*** -0.3941*** 
  
1.1372*** 
 
(1.511) (0.088) 
  
(0.407) 
CONSTANT 90.7870*** 99.8255*** 
  
97.4811*** 
 
(0.688) (0.041) 
  
(0.205) 
Observations 325 928 
  
1,253 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
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Table15b: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Input (Process) Quality 
Measures (Hospitals for Which Documentation Rate Declined are Excluded) 
 
  1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES   HSM_IMPL (75973) 
YEAR 08 12.7229*** 2.5639*** 0.0392 -4.1514*** 2.8154*** 
 
(1.459) (0.547) (0.449) (0.960) (0.532) 
CONSTANT 78.5533*** 92.0541*** 96.2373*** 99.7389*** 91.6875*** 
 
(0.996) (0.374) (0.309) (0.641) (0.376) 
Observations 302 291 321 298 1,212 
VARIABLES   HSM_IMPL (9962) 
YEAR 08 24.1953*** 7.6105*** 1.8416*** -1.7291*** 8.0610*** 
 
(1.616) (0.361) (0.433) (0.395) (0.613) 
CONSTANT 69.6383*** 88.8531*** 94.0356*** 98.7269*** 87.6771*** 
 
(1.085) (0.249) (0.296) (0.266) (0.436) 
Observations 298 291 272 299 1,160 
VARIABLES KAROT (9556) 
YEAR 08 21.6663*** 0.5300 -5.8727*** 
 
3.7481*** 
 
(2.873) (0.968) (0.821) 
 
(1.152) 
CONSTANT 68.5495*** 91.7842*** 99.1441*** 
 
88.7450*** 
 
(1.375) (0.469) (0.364) 
 
(0.601) 
Observations 186 165 313 
 
664 
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (43757) 
YEAR 08 15.1257*** 2.2140*** -0.9469* -3.7274*** 3.4083*** 
 
(2.058) (0.490) (0.495) (0.703) (0.681) 
CONSTANT 72.6310*** 90.0860*** 94.9202*** 99.3373*** 88.9649*** 
 
(0.963) (0.237) (0.226) (0.322) (0.379) 
Observations 218 215 230 188 851 
VARIABLES   MAMMA (46201) 
YEAR 08 17.3639*** 0.6731 -3.5304*** 
 
2.7311*** 
 
(2.580) (0.872) (0.950) 
 
(0.913) 
CONSTANT 72.1330*** 97.2751*** 99.7511*** 
 
92.0369*** 
 
(1.622) (0.590) (0.608) 
 
(0.610) 
Observations 279 259 544 
 
1,082 
VARIABLES   MAMMA (68100) 
YEAR 08 35.4551*** 6.4365*** -5.9000*** 
 
7.0336*** 
 
(3.319) (1.318) (1.197) 
 
(1.304) 
CONSTANT 39.0665*** 83.8295*** 98.7476*** 
 
79.8910*** 
 
(1.974) (0.911) (0.758) 
 
(0.868) 
Observations 248 239 487 
 
974 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
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Table 16a: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Output Quality 
Measures (Hospitals for Which Documentation Rate Declined are Excluded) 
 
  1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES   KORO_PCI (69891) 
YEAR 08 33.5190*** 2.1068*** -0.4786 -3.4207*** 5.7790*** 
 
(5.364) (0.440) (0.332) (0.659) (1.239) 
CONSTANT 44.6276*** 91.4147*** 95.3286*** 99.6370*** 84.0225*** 
 
(2.908) (0.300) (0.224) (0.394) (0.830) 
Observations 147 189 187 146 669 
VARIABLES   KORO_PCI (69889) 
YEAR 08 -10.2204*** 0.4977 0.6460** 1.8819*** -2.1832*** 
 
(2.154) (0.342) (0.252) (0.555) (0.702) 
CONSTANT 16.5209*** 3.7906*** 1.1753*** -2.22E-16 5.5431*** 
 
(1.015) (0.162) (0.119) (0.302) (0.372) 
Observations 174 181 102 207 664 
VARIABLES   CHOL (44927) 
YEAR 08 -3.3889*** -0.0803 0.3440** 1.0296*** -0.3303 
 
(0.820) (0.091) (0.148) (0.094) (0.214) 
CONSTANT 4.4129*** 1.1424*** 0.5189*** -3.89E-16 1.3738*** 
 
(0.549) (0.063) (0.100) (0.064) (0.148) 
Observations 366 360 53 716 1,495 
VARIABLES   HSM_IMPL (11255) 
YEAR 08 -3.1995*** -0.3605*** 
 
0.9674*** -0.3308** 
 
(0.368) (0.126) 
 
(0.138) (0.144) 
CONSTANT 4.7793*** 1.2048*** 
 
-5.55E-17 1.4081*** 
 
(0.254) (0.086) 
 
(0.093) (0.101) 
Observations 322 214 
 
740 1,276 
VARIABLES   HSM_IMPL (11264) 
YEAR 08 -4.1433*** -0.2033 
 
1.7867*** -0.0147 
 
(0.474) (0.219) 
 
(0.217) (0.210) 
CONSTANT 7.2792*** 1.4989*** 
 
-9.99E-16 2.0837*** 
 
(0.322) (0.148) 
 
(0.147) (0.147) 
Observations 331 165 
 
779 1,275 
VARIABLES   HSM_IMPL (11265) 
YEAR 08 -2.8064*** -0.2180* 
 
1.3128*** -0.0031 
 
(0.364) (0.130) 
 
(0.157) (0.153) 
CONSTANT 4.8009*** 1.1634*** 
 
1.11E-16 1.4314*** 
 
(0.249) (0.087) 
 
(0.107) (0.107) 
Observations 344 191 
 
774 1,309 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
 
 
 
55 
 
Table 16b: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Output Quality 
Measures (Hospitals for Which Documentation Rate Declined are Excluded) 
 
  1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES   HUFT_TEP (45013) 
YEAR 08 -3.3754*** -0.2450*** 
 
0.8394*** -0.3708* 
 
(0.617) (0.053) 
 
(0.171) (0.190) 
CONSTANT 4.3943*** 0.6249*** 
 
-5.55E-17 1.1587*** 
 
(0.421) (0.036) 
 
(0.115) (0.131) 
Observations 371 269 
 
912 1,552 
VARIABLES   HUFT_TEP (45059) 
YEAR 08 -4.2913*** -0.8221*** 0.5120*** 2.2804*** -0.7519*** 
 
(0.376) (0.175) (0.151) (0.356) (0.172) 
CONSTANT 7.9603*** 3.1097*** 1.4319*** 0.0176 3.2581*** 
 
(0.260) (0.119) (0.102) (0.230) (0.119) 
Observations 417 362 370 380 1,529 
 VARIABLES  HUFT_TEP (45108) 
YEAR 08 -3.2985*** -0.0156 
 
0.8360*** -0.4314** 
 
(0.607) (0.081) 
 
(0.111) (0.178) 
CONSTANT 4.5839*** 0.8155*** 
 
5.55E-17 1.3337*** 
 
(0.421) (0.055) 
 
(0.074) (0.123) 
Observations 382 368 
 
788 1,538 
 VARIABLES  KAROT (68415) 
YEAR 08 -7.4935*** 0.6157** 
 
2.8860*** -0.4905 
 
(2.002) (0.284) 
 
(0.396) (0.632) 
CONSTANT 10.4899*** 2.0176*** 
 
1.33E-15 3.2464*** 
 
(1.382) (0.192) 
 
(0.262) (0.452) 
Observations 159 148 
 
297 606 
 VARIABLES  KNIE_TEP (45059) 
YEAR 08 -2.7893*** -0.7660*** 0.1146 1.1737*** -0.5427*** 
 
(0.263) (0.134) (0.088) (0.144) (0.106) 
CONSTANT 5.4101*** 2.1665*** 0.9975*** 1.11E-16 2.0986*** 
 
(0.179) (0.092) (0.059) (0.094) (0.073) 
Observations 336 329 276 396 1,337 
 VARIABLES  KNIE_TEP (47390) 
YEAR 08 -1.4027*** -0.1209* 
 
0.4399*** -0.0806 
 
(0.231) (0.068) 
 
(0.049) (0.070) 
CONSTANT 2.6123*** 0.5500*** 
 
3.33E-16 0.6838*** 
 
(0.159) (0.047) 
 
(0.033) (0.049) 
Observations 311 190 
 
840 1,341 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
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Table 17a: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Input (Process) Quality 
Measures (Hospitals with Documentation Errors are Excluded) 
 
  1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES   CHOL (44800) 
YEAR 08 2.8361*** 0.0888 -0.9720*** 
 
0.3215 
 
(0.535) (0.075) (0.269) 
 
(0.201) 
CONSTANT 95.8594*** 99.0612*** 99.9802*** 
 
98.6369*** 
 
(0.255) (0.036) (0.128) 
 
(0.102) 
Observations 571 518 1,017 
 
2,106 
VARIABLES   GEBH (737) 
YEAR 08 34.3809*** 8.9928*** 1.4120** -18.8233*** 5.6959*** 
 
(4.303) (2.709) (0.706) (3.125) (1.645) 
CONSTANT 7.1173*** 67.6725*** 93.3495*** 99.6616*** 66.9032*** 
 
(1.638) (1.182) (0.327) (1.344) (0.815) 
Observations 289 266 300 279 1,134 
VARIABLES   GEBH (49523) 
YEAR 08 82.1450*** 37.7072*** 0.0703 
 
15.4012*** 
 
(8.249) (3.637) (1.531) 
 
(2.311) 
CONSTANT -1.78E-15 51.2408*** 93.6351*** 
 
62.1890*** 
 
(0.954) (1.328) (0.611) 
 
(0.917) 
Observations 173 126 386 
 
685 
VARIABLES   GEBH (82913) 
YEAR 08 31.2128*** -2.4702*** 
  
5.4478*** 
 
(3.080) (0.491) 
  
(1.021) 
CONSTANT 59.6559*** 99.9198*** 
  
90.1001*** 
 
(1.256) (0.210) 
  
(0.482) 
Observations 309 958 
  
1,267 
VARIABLES  GYN_OP (47637) 
YEAR 08 24.3142*** 1.3488*** -1.7717*** -2.1503*** 5.3722*** 
 
(2.045) (0.463) (0.474) (0.679) (0.682) 
CONSTANT 62.2316*** 94.1016*** 98.2658*** 99.9022*** 88.6129*** 
 
(0.933) (0.218) (0.225) (0.301) (0.352) 
Observations 399 414 420 372 1,605 
 VARIABLES  GYN_OP (50554) 
YEAR 08 5.9660*** -0.3872*** 
  
1.2677*** 
 
(1.249) (0.071) 
  
(0.343) 
CONSTANT 91.0200*** 99.8225*** 
  
97.4995*** 
 
(0.574) (0.033) 
  
(0.174) 
Observations 446 1,244 
  
1,690 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
 
 
 
57 
 
Table 17b: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Input (Process) Quality 
Measures (Hospitals with Documentation Errors are Excluded) 
 
  1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES   HSM_IMPL (75973) 
YEAR 08 13.4015*** 2.6212*** 0.1516 -4.2642*** 3.1213*** 
 
(1.322) (0.454) (0.368) (0.922) (0.486) 
CONSTANT 78.1917*** 92.0628*** 96.2464*** 99.7399*** 91.4317*** 
 
(0.631) (0.219) (0.177) (0.431) (0.259) 
Observations 411 399 417 383 1,610 
 VARIABLES  HSM_IMPL (9962) 
YEAR 08 24.2420*** 7.7719*** 1.9165*** -1.5490*** 8.1553*** 
 
(1.464) (0.290) (0.362) (0.323) (0.537) 
CONSTANT 69.7282*** 88.7975*** 94.0176*** 98.7673*** 87.7480*** 
 
(0.690) (0.139) (0.175) (0.150) (0.292) 
Observations 386 380 392 372 1,530 
 VARIABLES  KAROT (9556) 
YEAR 08 20.5810*** 0.4733 -6.3379*** 
 
2.6034** 
 
(2.609) (0.898) (1.011) 
 
(1.040) 
CONSTANT 68.8936*** 91.8659*** 99.1611*** 
 
89.4454*** 
 
(1.225) (0.430) (0.450) 
 
(0.531) 
Observations 213 211 398 
 
822 
 VARIABLES  KORO_PCI (43757) 
YEAR 08 14.4910*** 2.0206*** -1.0375** -4.7327*** 2.8108*** 
 
(1.849) (0.444) (0.443) (0.938) (0.624) 
CONSTANT 73.2340*** 90.0059*** 94.8829*** 99.3416*** 89.2731*** 
 
(0.871) (0.217) (0.205) (0.431) (0.343) 
Observations 278 285 273 270 1,106 
VARIABLES   MAMMA (46201) 
YEAR 08 14.9699*** 1.1658** -2.7703*** 
 
2.3398*** 
 
(2.046) (0.533) (0.634) 
 
(0.632) 
CONSTANT 74.3958*** 97.2185*** 99.7547*** 
 
93.0208*** 
 
(0.873) (0.255) (0.285) 
 
(0.315) 
Observations 382 426 791 
 
1,599 
VARIABLES   MAMMA (68100) 
YEAR 08 37.5160*** 6.7185*** -6.3421*** 
 
6.8225*** 
 
(2.877) (1.139) (1.091) 
 
(1.112) 
CONSTANT 39.2633*** 84.3329*** 98.7058*** 
 
80.6037*** 
 
(1.115) (0.538) (0.479) 
 
(0.552) 
Observations 338 383 693 
 
1,414 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
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Table 18a: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Output Quality 
Measures (Hospitals with Documentation Errors are Excluded) 
  1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES   KORO_PCI (69891) 
YEAR 08 29.4165*** 2.0822*** -0.5516* -3.6827*** 4.8688*** 
 
(4.468) (0.385) (0.312) (0.642) (1.014) 
CONSTANT 48.1517*** 91.3836*** 95.3277*** 99.6300*** 84.9545*** 
 
(1.570) (0.185) (0.148) (0.260) (0.523) 
Observations 185 233 229 200 847 
VARIABLES   KORO_PCI (69889) 
YEAR 08 2.0278*** 0.5605** 0.2305 -10.9250*** -2.3616*** 
 
(0.541) (0.213) (0.312) (2.063) (0.662) 
CONSTANT -0.0000 1.2355*** 3.8573*** 16.8344*** 5.5867*** 
 
(0.194) (0.101) (0.149) (0.970) (0.350) 
Observations 270 132 220 219 841 
VARIABLES   CHOL (44927) 
YEAR 08 -2.5646*** -0.1392* 0.3484** 1.0269*** -0.1631 
 
(0.434) (0.075) (0.128) (0.081) (0.123) 
CONSTANT 3.8350*** 1.1520*** 0.5123*** -8.88E-16 1.2477*** 
 
(0.205) (0.036) (0.061) (0.038) (0.062) 
Observations 507 509 65 974 2,055 
VARIABLES   HSM_IMPL (11255) 
YEAR 08 -3.0279*** -0.2540 
 
1.2100*** -0.1168 
 
(0.306) (0.157) 
 
(0.246) (0.174) 
CONSTANT 4.7162*** 1.2061*** 
 
0.0000 1.3815*** 
 
(0.149) (0.075) 
 
(0.117) (0.092) 
Observations 417 296 
 
969 1,682 
VARIABLES   HSM_IMPL (11264) 
YEAR 08 -4.2836*** -0.1555 
 
1.7249*** -0.0325 
 
(0.408) (0.187) 
 
(0.184) (0.178) 
CONSTANT 7.3143*** 1.5387*** 
 
2.22E-16 2.0299*** 
 
(0.195) (0.089) 
 
(0.088) (0.093) 
Observations 420 233 
 
1,037 1,690 
VARIABLES   HSM_IMPL (11265) 
YEAR 08 -2.8148*** -0.2078* 
 
1.3037*** 0.0270 
 
(0.330) (0.110) 
 
(0.135) (0.131) 
CONSTANT 4.8772*** 1.1552*** 
 
-2.22E-16 1.4042*** 
 
(0.159) (0.052) 
 
(0.065) (0.068) 
Observations 435 270 
 
1,028 1,733 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
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Table 18b: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Output Quality 
Measures (Hospitals with Documentation Errors are Excluded) 
 
  1
ST
 QUARTILE 2
ND
 QUARTILE 3
RD
 QUARTILE 4
TH
 QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES   HUFT_TEP (45013) 
YEAR 08 -2.8908*** -0.1866*** 
 
0.8123*** -0.2320 
 
(0.497) (0.047) 
 
(0.144) (0.149) 
CONSTANT 3.9800*** 0.6236*** 
 
1.67E-16 1.0259*** 
 
(0.239) (0.023) 
 
(0.068) (0.076) 
Observations 465 395 
 
1,184 2,044 
VARIABLES   HUFT_TEP (45059) 
YEAR 08 -4.0570*** -0.9125*** 0.5021*** 2.4773*** -0.5908*** 
 
(0.326) (0.141) (0.124) (0.400) (0.155) 
CONSTANT 7.6716*** 3.1056*** 1.4167*** 0.0229 3.0989*** 
 
(0.159) (0.068) (0.059) (0.182) (0.079) 
Observations 517 503 504 494 2,018 
VARIABLES   HUFT_TEP (45108) 
YEAR 08 -3.0488*** -0.0747 
 
0.8284*** -0.3939*** 
 
(0.463) (0.056) 
 
(0.095) (0.138) 
CONSTANT 4.2763*** 0.7929*** 
 
5.55E-17 1.2672*** 
 
(0.227) (0.027) 
 
(0.045) (0.071) 
Observations 506 504 
 
1,013 2,023 
VARIABLES KAROT (68415) 
YEAR 08 -6.9383*** 0.6170** 
 
2.8835*** -0.2838 
 
(1.660) (0.284) 
 
(0.363) (0.517) 
CONSTANT 9.9383*** 2.0520*** 
 
8.88E-16 3.0501*** 
 
(0.809) (0.136) 
 
(0.167) (0.289) 
Observations 193 196 
 
370 761 
VARIABLES KNIE_TEP (45059) 
YEAR 08 -2.6448*** -0.2880 0.1190 1.1731*** -0.4001*** 
 
(0.220) (0.474) (0.077) (0.131) (0.150) 
CONSTANT 5.3194*** 2.1914*** 1.0129*** 5.55E-16 2.1087*** 
 
(0.106) (0.230) (0.037) (0.060) (0.077) 
Observations 434 444 370 486 1,734 
VARIABLES KNIE_TEP (47390) 
YEAR 08 -1.4719*** -0.1250** 
 
0.6228*** 0.0116 
 
(0.178) (0.057) 
 
(0.203) (0.135) 
CONSTANT 2.5253*** 0.5626*** 
 
2.78E-16 0.6733*** 
 
(0.086) (0.027) 
 
(0.095) (0.069) 
Observations 404 257 
 
1,069 1,730 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
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Tables 19a: Change in the Fictitious Market Shares of Hospitals from 2006 to 2008 in Each Service Area 
by Quartile of Quality of the Corresponding Input (Process) Quality Indicator  
 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE 
VARIABLES CHOL (44800) 
YEAR 08 0.0022* 0.0001 -0.0014  
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  
CONSTANT 0.1025*** 0.1277*** 0.0971***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Observations 522 478 880  
VARIABLES GEBH (737) 
YEAR 08 -0.0021 -0.0017 -0.0001 0.0041 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
CONSTANT 0.1141*** 0.1770*** 0.2481*** 0.1671*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Observations 298 270 292 274 
VARIABLES GEBH (49523) 
YEAR 08 -0.0025 0.0024 0.0017  
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)  
CONSTANT 0.1207*** 0.2365*** 0.2224***  
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  
Observations 240 136 384  
VARIABLES GEBH (82913) 
YEAR 08 0.0002 -0.0003   
 (0.002) (0.002)   
CONSTANT 0.1578*** 0.1854***   
 (0.001) (0.001)   
Observations 274 782   
VARIABLES GYN_OP (47637) 
YEAR 08 0.0035 -0.0031 0.0046 -0.0058 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
CONSTANT 0.1155*** 0.1614*** 0.1379*** 0.1256*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 358 402 394 314 
VARIABLES GYN_OP (50554) 
YEAR 08 -0.0030 0.0011   
 (0.003) (0.002)   
CONSTANT 0.1344*** 0.1369***   
 (0.002) (0.001)   
Observations 398 1,070   
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
  
61 
 
Tables 19b: Change in the Fictitious Market Shares of Hospitals from 2006 to 2008 in Each Service Area 
by Quartile of Quality of the Corresponding Input (Process) Quality Indicator  
 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (75973) 
YEAR 08 -0.0041 0.0012 -0.0003 0.0042 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
CONSTANT 0.1604*** 0.1886*** 0.1950*** 0.1366*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 276 302 358 212 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (9962) 
YEAR 08 -0.0056 0.0023 -0.0001 0.0034 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
CONSTANT 0.1800*** 0.1748*** 0.1875*** 0.1495*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations 270 324 314 240 
VARIABLES KAROT (9556) 
YEAR 08 -0.0005 -0.0027 0.0055  
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.013)  
CONSTANT 0.3945*** 0.4507*** 0.3319***  
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)  
Observations 122 178 192  
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (43757) 
YEAR 08 0.0193** -0.0253 0.0027 0.0107** 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) 
CONSTANT 0.2443*** 0.3035*** 0.2501*** 0.2077*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 184 228 230 128 
VARIABLES MAMMA (46201) 
YEAR 08 -0.0138 -0.0009 0.0065  
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)  
CONSTANT 0.1364*** 0.2129*** 0.1748***  
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)  
Observations 230 352 536  
VARIABLES MAMMA (68100) 
YEAR 08 0.0076 -0.0051 0.0004  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.004)  
CONSTANT 0.1403*** 0.1950*** 0.1834***  
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)  
Observations 216 368 534  
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
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Tables 20a: Change in the Fictitious Market Shares of Hospitals from 2006 to 2008 in Each Service Area 
by Quartile of Quality of the Corresponding Output Quality Indicator    
 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE 
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (69891) 
YEAR 08 0.0061 0.0004 -0.0160 0.0136*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.019) (0.005) 
CONSTANT 0.1533*** 0.3177*** 0.3724*** 0.1318*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) 
Observations 162 222 218 178 
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (69889) 
YEAR 08 -0.0103 -0.0051 -0.0086 0.0176*** 
 (0.021) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) 
CONSTANT 0.3439*** 0.3266*** 0.3065*** 0.0851*** 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations 200 210 122 210 
VARIABLES CHOL (44927) 
YEAR 08 -0.0002 -0.0019 -0.0151*** 0.0022** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) 
CONSTANT 0.1023*** 0.1359*** 0.2072*** 0.0856*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
Observations 480 472 60 868 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (11255) 
YEAR 08 -0.0036 -0.0049  0.0039 
 (0.004) (0.007)  (0.003) 
CONSTANT 0.1422*** 0.2711***  0.1520*** 
 (0.002) (0.004)  (0.002) 
Observations 316 240  592 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (11264) 
YEAR 08 -0.0035 -0.0056  0.0034 
 (0.004) (0.009)  (0.003) 
CONSTANT 0.1417*** 0.2804***  0.1589*** 
 (0.002) (0.005)  (0.001) 
Observations 322 190  636 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (11265) 
YEAR 08 0.0012 -0.0088  0.0024 
 (0.003) (0.009)  (0.003) 
CONSTANT 0.1351*** 0.2840***  0.1570*** 
 (0.002) (0.005)  (0.001) 
Observations 326 212  610 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
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Tables 20b: Change in the Fictitious Market Shares of Hospitals from 2006 to 2008 in Each Service Area 
by Quartile of Quality of the Corresponding Output Quality Indicator    
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE 
VARIABLES HUFT_TEP (45013) 
YEAR 08 0.0005 -0.0074**  0.0030** 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.001) 
CONSTANT 0.0823*** 0.2436***  0.0881*** 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) 
Observations 384 378  866 
VARIABLES HUFT_TEP (45059) 
YEAR 08 -0.0001 -0.0021 -0.0020 0.0071*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
CONSTANT 0.0714*** 0.1246*** 0.1860*** 0.0860*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 398 472 476 282 
VARIABLES HUFT_TEP (45108) 
YEAR 08 0.0023 -0.0097***  0.0050*** 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.001) 
CONSTANT 0.0835*** 0.2066***  0.0910*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Observations 422 476  730 
VARIABLES KAROT (68415) 
YEAR 08 0.0080 -0.0074  0.0001 
 (0.017) (0.016)  (0.014) 
CONSTANT 0.3410*** 0.5261***  0.2936*** 
 (0.009) (0.008)  (0.007) 
Observations 140 186  182 
VARIABLES KNIE_TEP (45059) 
YEAR 08 0.0059** -0.0068** 0.0009 -0.0002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
CONSTANT 0.0844*** 0.2044*** 0.1338*** 0.1066*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 352 352 424 390 
VARIABLES KNIE_TEP (47390) 
YEAR 08 0.00003 -0.0072  0.0020 
 (0.003) (0.005)  (0.002) 
CONSTANT 0.1031*** 0.2470***  0.1121*** 
 (0.001) (0.003)  (0.001) 
Observations 374 246  898 
 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
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Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of the Hospitals in the Sample 
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APPENDIX 
 
Accessing Hospital and Quality Information Online 
There are many websites and search engines that operationalize the quality reports. An example is 
http://www.bkk-klinikfinder.de/. Having logged on this website, one can enter his/her postcode information, 
specify the radius distance and the field in which care is sought.  
 
 
 
Having provided the information mentioned above, one can see the list of hospitals that offer care in the relevant 
field in the specified geographical area. Furthermore, the quality information on the relevant indicators is also 
displayed in a simplified manner.  
 
In this example, a green light refers to good quality for the relevant quality indicator (the result of the hospital 
lies within the reference range), a yellow light indicates average quality (the result of the hospital lies outside the 
reference range, but it is above the German average), while a red light indicates a lower level of quality (the 
result of the hospital lies outside the reference range and it is below the German average). Finally the white 
color means that the result of the hospital is not available or the result is implausible.  
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Table A6a: Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Input (Process) Quality Measures (Fixed Effects 
Weighted Least Squares with Hospital Dummies)  
 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES CHOL (44800) 
YEAR 08 2.3705*** -0.0156 -0.5345***  0.3974** 
 (0.580) (0.099) (0.058)  (0.165) 
CONSTANT 96.5138*** 99.0770*** 99.9579***  98.7709*** 
 (0.385) (0.070) (0.038)  (0.110) 
Observations 566 520 978  2,064 
VARIABLES GEBH (737) 
YEAR 08 33.6799*** 10.0621*** 2.2236*** -12.4851*** 5.2191*** 
 (5.387) (2.788) (0.561) (2.682) (1.322) 
CONSTANT 8.2018*** 70.2159*** 93.4630*** 99.4278*** 75.5137*** 
 (3.040) (1.834) (0.384) (1.739) (0.856) 
Observations 287 270 302 278 1,137 
VARIABLES GEBH (49523) 
YEAR 08 77.8100*** 34.9158*** 1.6777  14.2325*** 
 (20.439) (4.331) (1.270)  (2.283) 
CONSTANT 0.2465 51.2796*** 92.7522***  69.6189*** 
 (4.112) (2.732) (0.809)  (1.301) 
Observations 172 131 391  694 
VARIABLES GEBH (82913) 
YEAR 08 24.2235*** -2.2174***   3.8273*** 
 (3.114) (0.532)   (0.928) 
CONSTANT 68.2382*** 99.9055***   92.7687*** 
 (1.996) (0.329)   (0.583) 
Observations 309 950   1,259 
VARIABLES GYN_OP (47637) 
YEAR 08 22.5532*** 1.2568** -1.2618*** -3.7405 4.0469*** 
 (2.159) (0.492) (0.326) (2.372) (0.818) 
CONSTANT 66.7890*** 94.0396*** 98.2437*** 99.8180*** 90.6321*** 
 (1.481) (0.334) (0.223) (1.614) (0.556) 
Observations 381 417 419 339 1,556 
VARIABLES GYN_OP (50554) 
YEAR 08 4.8884*** -0.3292***   1.0501*** 
 (1.185) (0.054)   (0.327) 
CONSTANT 94.1045*** 99.7415***   98.2470*** 
 (0.812) (0.037)   (0.225) 
Observations 436 1,195   1,631 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
ð The number of cases in the relevant service area is used as weights. 
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Table A6b: Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Input (Process) Quality Measures (Fixed Effects 
Weighted Least Squares)  
 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (75973) 
YEAR 08 11.8043*** 3.6426*** 0.6362** -1.4335*** 3.5971*** 
 (1.583) (0.344) (0.268) (0.295) (0.415) 
CONSTANT 80.7651*** 92.0785*** 96.2217*** 99.2916*** 92.2238*** 
 (1.092) (0.232) (0.181) (0.202) (0.282) 
Observations 362 380 415 314 1,471 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (9962) 
YEAR 08 21.3946*** 6.9783*** 1.3916** -1.1108*** 7.1534*** 
 (1.574) (0.312) (0.596) (0.363) (0.602) 
CONSTANT 72.8503*** 88.9666*** 94.0389*** 98.1498*** 88.4428*** 
 (1.068) (0.217) (0.403) (0.253) (0.412) 
Observations 338 364 375 317 1,394 
VARIABLES KAROT (9556) 
YEAR 08 11.4496*** -0.0675 -4.9663***  0.8515 
 (2.328) (0.916) (1.048)  (0.909) 
CONSTANT 79.6337*** 92.0465*** 97.9353***  91.4070*** 
 (1.623) (0.642) (0.707)  (0.623) 
Observations 162 208 287  657 
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (43757) 
YEAR 08 7.7304*** 1.4891** -0.3786 -1.8701*** 1.9447*** 
 (1.625) (0.575) (0.446) (0.583) (0.490) 
CONSTANT 80.6980*** 89.9898*** 94.7587*** 98.5838*** 90.5240*** 
 (1.140) (0.351) (0.281) (0.394) (0.325) 
Observations 247 281 270 205 1,003 
VARIABLES MAMMA (46201) 
YEAR 08 7.2875*** 1.4394*** -0.2669  1.4549*** 
 (1.418) (0.329) (0.165)  (0.263) 
CONSTANT 89.1983*** 97.3713*** 99.4834***  97.1598*** 
 (0.865) (0.230) (0.112)  (0.181) 
Observations 288 422 647  1,357 
VARIABLES MAMMA (68100) 
YEAR 08 32.5509*** 9.3282*** -2.3514***  6.9860*** 
 (3.205) (0.981) (0.639)  (0.961) 
CONSTANT 53.1552*** 84.2127*** 97.7093***  85.9701*** 
 (2.220) (0.702) (0.442)  (0.682) 
Observations 251 384 604  1,239 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
ð The number of cases in the relevant service area is used as weights. 
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Table A7a: Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Output Quality Measures (Fixed Effects Weighted 
Least Squares)  
 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (69891) 
YEAR 08 14.8930*** 1.8159*** -0.4947* -2.9623*** 1.9326*** 
 (4.052) (0.355) (0.268) (0.565) (0.563) 
CONSTANT 77.5283*** 91.5474*** 95.2590*** 98.9860*** 92.1998*** 
 (2.716) (0.238) (0.172) (0.381) (0.380) 
Observations 151 232 229 177 789 
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (69889) 
YEAR 08 -4.7333*** 0.1836 0.7613*** 1.5692*** -1.2746*** 
 (0.954) (0.385) (0.224) (0.452) (0.400) 
CONSTANT 11.0466*** 3.9127*** 1.1185*** 0.1136 5.4322*** 
 (0.640) (0.251) (0.144) (0.310) (0.264) 
Observations 217 221 132 227 797 
VARIABLES CHOL (44927) 
YEAR 08 -2.4791*** -0.0672 0.3499*** 1.0464*** -0.1965 
 (0.706) (0.073) (0.120) (0.075) (0.177) 
CONSTANT 3.5528*** 1.1202*** 0.5071*** -0.0044 1.2513*** 
 (0.514) (0.051) (0.078) (0.052) (0.131) 
Observations 505 509 65 936 2,015 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (11255) 
YEAR 08 -2.0064*** -0.2213*  0.6152*** -0.1803** 
 (0.186) (0.120)  (0.059) (0.071) 
CONSTANT 3.4375*** 1.0859***  0.0184 1.0436*** 
 (0.128) (0.077)  (0.040) (0.048) 
Observations 388 294  846 1,528 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (11264) 
YEAR 08 -2.9520*** -0.0299  1.0297*** -0.0683 
 (0.277) (0.192)  (0.103) (0.109) 
CONSTANT 5.2840*** 1.3436***  0.0579 1.4806*** 
 (0.185) (0.127)  (0.070) (0.073) 
Observations 396 233  922 1,551 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (11265) 
YEAR 08 -1.8675*** -0.1389  0.8966*** 0.0391 
 (0.234) (0.117)  (0.085) (0.082) 
CONSTANT 3.5885*** 1.0453***  0.0077 1.0233*** 
 (0.157) (0.079)  (0.056) (0.055) 
Observations 403 270  907 1,580 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
ð The number of cases in the relevant service area is used as weights. 
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Table A7b: Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Output Quality Measures (Fixed Effects 
Weighted Least Squares) 
 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES HUFT_TEP (45013) 
YEAR 08 -2.5868** -0.1387***  0.3867*** -0.3210 
 (1.190) (0.034)  (0.041) (0.195) 
CONSTANT 3.1858*** 0.5372***  0.0162 0.7607*** 
 (0.846) (0.023)  (0.029) (0.141) 
Observations 433 395  1,015 1,843 
VARIABLES HUFT_TEP (45059) 
YEAR 08 -2.8884*** -0.9918*** 0.1509 1.1663*** -0.4892*** 
 (0.203) (0.120) (0.100) (0.195) (0.078) 
CONSTANT 5.9549*** 2.9881*** 1.3331*** 0.2190 2.3353*** 
 (0.140) (0.082) (0.067) (0.140) (0.053) 
Observations 461 500 502 365 1,828 
VARIABLES HUFT_TEP (45108) 
YEAR 08 -1.9085*** -0.0445  0.5694*** -0.1821** 
 (0.307) (0.052)  (0.056) (0.071) 
CONSTANT 2.7700*** 0.6446***  -0.0019 0.8139*** 
 (0.206) (0.035)  (0.039) (0.048) 
Observations 479 502  853 1,834 
VARIABLES KAROT (68415) 
YEAR 08 -3.5719*** 0.5836**  2.5677*** 0.1095 
 (1.220) (0.244)  (0.337) (0.359) 
CONSTANT 6.3494*** 1.9197***  0.0864 2.4739*** 
 (0.932) (0.159)  (0.226) (0.258) 
Observations 161 194  247 604 
VARIABLES KNIE_TEP (45059) 
YEAR 08 -2.2661*** -0.4257 0.0515 1.0527*** -0.4077*** 
 (0.165) (0.375) (0.076) (0.110) (0.125) 
CONSTANT 4.6376*** 2.1112*** 0.9632*** 0.0067 1.9054*** 
 (0.117) (0.254) (0.053) (0.080) (0.085) 
Observations 419 444 370 409 1,642 
VARIABLES KNIE_TEP (47390) 
YEAR 08 -1.0661*** -0.0853  0.5558*** 0.0504 
 (0.133) (0.053)  (0.211) (0.113) 
CONSTANT 1.8449*** 0.4765***  -0.0186 0.4902*** 
 (0.092) (0.038)  (0.141) (0.076) 
Observations 396 257  991 1,644 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation. Hence the empty cells with the grey background. 
ð The number of cases in the relevant service area is used as weights. 
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Table A8a: Change in Quality Scores across Different Organizational Forms for Process (Input) Quality 
Measures (Fixed Effects Weighted Least Squares) 
 
VARIABLES 
CHOL 
(44800) 
GEBH (737) 
GEBH 
(49523) 
GEBH 
(82913) 
GYN_OP 
(47637) 
GYN_OP 
(50554) 
PUBLIC -2.0507 -14.1218 9.7609 -17.5439 -0.9968 -0.1320 
 
(1.581) (13.317) (35.853) (18.136) (2.838) (0.572) 
PRIVATE -2.6762** -9.3850 0.5538 -11.4632 6.9305 -0.2154 
 
(1.185) (12.327) (29.278) (14.936) (7.598) (0.639) 
YEAR 08 0.2433*** 2.5020 13.5454*** 5.7795*** 3.9613*** 1.1355** 
 
(0.087) (2.454) (4.353) (1.538) (1.056) (0.479) 
PUBLIC * YEAR 08 0.2554 6.0778** 0.2908 -3.6060* 0.8846 0.0117 
 
(0.390) (3.047) (5.407) (2.119) (1.490) (0.785) 
PRIVATE * YEAR 08 0.4093 -2.8601 6.0565 -2.9532 -2.8423 -0.6744 
 
(0.304) (5.420) (9.115) (2.390) (4.654) (0.554) 
CONSTANT 99.9888*** 81.4534*** 64.9354*** 102.3006*** 90.0673*** 98.3235*** 
  (0.830) (6.698) (20.604) (9.872) (1.532) (0.386) 
Observations 2,176 1,296 789 1,378 1,730 1,768 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð Nonprofit hospitals are excluded as the base group. 
 
Table A8b: Change in Quality Scores across Different Organizational Forms for Process (Input) Quality 
Measures (Fixed Effects Weighted Least Squares) 
 
VARIABLES 
HSM_IMPL 
(75973) 
HSM_IMPL 
(9962) 
KAROT 
(9556) 
KORO_PCI 
(43757) 
MAMMA 
(46201) 
MAMMA 
(68100) 
PUBLIC -0.0925 -0.5307 -2.4116 4.0298* 0.3478 -11.3633*** 
 
(2.189) (3.392) (8.849) (2.410) (1.715) (3.051) 
PRIVATE 0.2175 3.2349 -0.9903 0.7968 -0.2562 -3.6691 
 
(2.076) (3.140) (8.227) (1.803) (1.842) (6.059) 
YEAR 08 3.2235*** 7.2191*** -0.3894 2.7278*** 1.2534*** 4.4460*** 
 
(0.528) (0.840) (1.201) (0.980) (0.311) (1.290) 
PUBLIC * YEAR 08 0.9405 0.5703 1.9007 -1.2101 0.4150 4.6153** 
 
(0.955) (1.452) (1.964) (1.292) (0.609) (1.996) 
PRIVATE * YEAR 08 -0.3108 -2.2646* 1.4124 -0.9321 0.1380 3.0025 
 
(1.106) (1.344) (2.413) (1.275) (0.511) (4.471) 
CONSTANT 92.0502*** 88.1682*** 92.6289*** 88.3424*** 97.0184*** 91.5954*** 
  (1.040) (1.739) (5.926) (1.400) (1.004) (1.718) 
Observations 1,652 1,612 733 1,168 1,456 1,383 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð Nonprofit hospitals are excluded as the base group. 
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Table A9a: Change in Quality Scores across Different Organizational Forms for Output Quality 
Measures (Fixed Effects Weighted Least Squares)  
 
VARIABLES 
KORO_PCI 
(69889) 
KORO_PCI 
(69891) 
CHOL 
(44927) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11255) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11264) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11265) 
PUBLIC -0.2571 3.5634 0.5617 0.6203 0.1135 0.4341 
 
(1.396) (4.607) (0.561) (0.767) (1.019) (0.719) 
PRIVATE 0.8206 2.2510 -0.1681 0.5755 1.5911 0.2987 
 
(1.161) (3.442) (0.682) (0.956) (1.113) (0.583) 
YEAR 08 -1.5193** 1.5687 -0.1365 -0.2646* -0.0330 0.0033 
 
(0.695) (0.961) (0.120) (0.141) (0.203) (0.151) 
PUBLIC * 
YEAR 08 
0.2700 1.2387 -0.1611 0.1401 -0.1234 0.1244 
(1.025) (1.442) (0.428) (0.170) (0.253) (0.198) 
PRIVATE * 
YEAR 08 
0.5710 -1.2160 0.0996 0.1282 0.1077 -0.1172 
(0.979) (1.162) (0.217) (0.240) (0.350) (0.242) 
CONSTANT 5.5350*** 89.9774*** 1.0264*** 0.6817 1.1959* 0.7772* 
  (0.850) (2.929) (0.292) (0.504) (0.612) (0.412) 
Observations 956 925 2,137 1,683 1,695 1,713 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð Nonprofit hospitals are excluded as the base group. 
 
Table A9b: Change in Quality Scores across Different Organizational Forms for Output Quality 
Measures (Fixed Effects Weighted Least Squares)  
 
VARIABLES 
HUFT_TEP 
(45013) 
HUFT_TEP 
(45059) 
HUFT_TEP 
(45108) 
KAROT 
(68415) 
KNIE_TEP 
(45059) 
KNIE_TEP 
(47390) 
PUBLIC 0.1768 1.6604* 0.5225 3.1805 -1.8063** -0.2648 
 
(0.338) (0.964) (0.422) (2.044) (0.912) (0.427) 
PRIVATE 0.0788 0.1081 0.9900** 1.5185 -1.1168 0.0130 
 
(0.335) (0.731) (0.481) (1.648) (0.992) (0.279) 
YEAR 08 -0.5638 -0.5812*** -0.1588** 0.4786 -0.5469*** -0.0798 
 
(0.441) (0.112) (0.063) (0.575) (0.112) (0.058) 
PUBLIC * 
YEAR 08 
0.3903 0.1670 0.0632 -0.7658 0.2964 0.3891 
(0.447) (0.190) (0.109) (0.876) (0.364) (0.335) 
PRIVATE * 
YEAR 08 
0.5224 0.1761 -0.2376 0.2665 0.1915 -0.0178 
(0.448) (0.196) (0.299) (0.752) (0.171) (0.118) 
CONSTANT 0.6806*** 1.7499*** 0.4297** 0.6067 2.7700*** 0.5761*** 
  (0.250) (0.410) (0.217) (1.254) (0.515) (0.199) 
Observations 1,937 1,933 1,937 727 1,762 1,764 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð Nonprofit hospitals are excluded as the base group. 
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Table A10a: Change in Quality Scores across Teaching Status for Process (Input) Quality Measures 
(Fixed Effects Weighted Least Squares)  
 
VARIABLES 
CHOL 
(44800) 
GEBH 
(737) 
GEBH 
(49523) 
GEBH 
(82513) 
GYN_OP 
(47637) 
GYN_OP 
(50554) 
YEAR 08 0.4854 3.4748 16.8606*** 5.1416*** 2.9867** 0.9717** 
 (0.339) (2.643) (4.403) (1.451) (1.406) (0.489) 
ACADEMIC * YEAR 08 -0.1669 2.8600 -3.7304 -2.2341 1.9829 0.1458 
 (0.354) (3.080) (5.285) (1.948) (1.750) (0.682) 
CONSTANT 98.7706*** 73.4863*** 69.9192*** 92.7018*** 90.5121*** 98.2345*** 
 (0.115) (0.933) (1.451) (0.619) (0.590) (0.237) 
Observations 2,176 1,296 789 1,378 1,730 1,768 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table A10b: Change in Quality Scores across Teaching Status for Process (Input) Quality Measures 
(Fixed Effects Weighted Least Squares)  
 
VARIABLES 
HSM_IMPL 
(75973) 
HSM_IMPL 
(9962) 
KAROT 
(9556) 
KORO_PCI 
(43757) 
MAMMA 
(46201) 
MAMMA 
(68100) 
YEAR 08 3.3679*** 8.3531*** 0.4032 1.6985** 1.8003*** 6.7295*** 
 (0.655) (1.003) (1.856) (0.704) (0.610) (1.925) 
ACADEMIC * YEAR 08 0.4016 -2.0732 0.6224 0.3580 -0.5450 0.4110 
 (0.884) (1.311) (2.167) (0.992) (0.659) (2.240) 
CONSTANT 92.0526*** 88.3933*** 91.2122*** 90.4892*** 97.1354*** 85.9472*** 
 (0.302) (0.450) (0.663) (0.353) (0.193) (0.735) 
Observations 1,652 1,612 733 1,168 1,456 1,383 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
  
73 
 
Table A11a: Change in Quality Scores across Teaching Status for Output Quality Measures (Fixed 
Effects Weighted Least Squares)  
 
VARIABLES 
KORO_PCI 
(69889) 
KORO_PCI 
(69891) 
CHOL 
(44927) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11255) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11264) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11265) 
YEAR 08 -1.8283* 1.5334 -0.4266 -0.2194 -0.1954 0.0571 
 (0.976) (1.014) (0.377) (0.134) (0.199) (0.136) 
ACADEMIC * YEAR 08 0.8089 0.5696 0.4337 0.0671 0.2176 -0.0310 
 (1.079) (1.264) (0.386) (0.159) (0.240) (0.174) 
CONSTANT 5.5746*** 92.1894*** 1.2512*** 1.0698*** 1.5263*** 1.0327*** 
 (0.296) (0.415) (0.137) (0.052) (0.078) (0.058) 
Observations 956 925 2,137 1,683 1,695 1,713 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table A11b: Change in Quality Scores across Teaching Status for Output Quality Measures (Fixed 
Effects Weighted Least Squares)  
 
 
VARIABLES 
HUFT_TEP 
(45013) 
HUFT_TEP 
(45059) 
HUFT_TEP 
(45108) 
KAROT 
(68415) 
KNIE_TEP 
(45059) 
KNIE_TEP 
(47390) 
YEAR 08 -0.1372*** -0.3770*** -0.1570 0.2563 -0.4527*** -0.0526 
 (0.044) (0.103) (0.117) (0.436) (0.088) (0.055) 
ACADEMIC * YEAR 08 -0.4123 -0.2525 -0.0561 -0.2070 0.1120 0.2572 
 (0.448) (0.163) (0.139) (0.683) (0.308) (0.286) 
CONSTANT 0.7574*** 2.3365*** 0.8155*** 2.5004*** 1.8983*** 0.4866*** 
 (0.145) (0.055) (0.049) (0.287) (0.089) (0.080) 
Observations 1,938 1,934 1,938 727 1,763 1,765 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A12a: Change in Quality Scores across Hospital Size for Process (Input) Quality Measures 
(Number of Beds / 100) (Fixed Effects Weighted Least Squares) 
 
VARIABLES 
CHOL 
(44800) 
GEBH 
(737) 
GEBH 
(49523) 
GEBH 
(82513) 
GYN_OP 
(47637) 
GYN_OP 
(50554) 
YEAR 08 0.4498** 5.2683** 15.3815*** 6.1333*** 4.1514*** 1.1950** 
 (0.228) (2.346) (4.134) (1.512) (1.129) (0.493) 
BEDS 06 * YEAR 08 -0.0114 -0.0081 -0.1536 -0.3936** 0.0803 -0.0297 
 (0.020) (0.220) (0.332) (0.170) (0.200) (0.050) 
CONSTANT 98.7664*** 73.4213*** 69.8331*** 92.6318*** 90.4222*** 98.2300*** 
 (0.114) (0.948) (1.481) (0.624) (0.466) (0.238) 
Observations 2,169 1,293 786 1,375 1,725 1,764 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table A12b: Change in Quality Scores across Hospital Size for Process (Input) Quality Measures 
(Number of Beds / 100) (Fixed Effects Weighted Least Squares) 
 
VARIABLES 
HSM_IMPL 
(75973) 
HSM_IMPL 
(9962) 
 
KAROT 
(9556) 
KORO_PCI 
(43757) 
MAMMA 
(46201) 
MAMMA 
(68100) 
YEAR 08 3.4067*** 8.4501***  0.7280 1.1498 2.0196*** 4.9219*** 
 (0.656) (1.280)  (2.179) (0.870) (0.407) (1.718) 
BEDS 06 * YEAR 08 0.0337 -0.2283  0.0158 0.1118 -0.0917 0.3331 
 (0.064) (0.227)  (0.285) (0.086) (0.068) (0.247) 
CONSTANT 92.0573*** 88.3682***  91.2090*** 90.5106*** 97.1238*** 85.9989*** 
 (0.304) (0.436)  (0.647) (0.353) (0.184) (0.726) 
Observations 1,648 1,608  730 1,165 1,452 1,380 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
  
75 
 
Table A13a: Change in Quality Scores across Hospital Size for Output Quality Measures (Number of 
Beds / 100) (Fixed Effects Weighted Least Squares) 
 
VARIABLES 
KORO_PCI 
(69889) 
KORO_PCI 
(69891) 
CHOL 
(44927) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11255) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11264) 
HSM_IMPL 
(11265) 
YEAR 08 -0.3124 2.5659** -0.4337 -0.2218* -0.1395 0.0940 
 (0.697) (1.133) (0.310) (0.116) (0.170) (0.128) 
BEDS 06 * YEAR 08 -0.1367* -0.0885 0.0531 0.0073 0.0126 -0.0097 
 (0.074) (0.092) (0.033) (0.012) (0.018) (0.014) 
CONSTANT 5.5491*** 92.1611*** 1.2550*** 1.0702*** 1.5264*** 1.0316*** 
 (0.284) (0.425) (0.136) (0.052) (0.078) (0.058) 
Observations 953 922 2,130 1,679 1,691 1,709 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Table A13b: Change in Quality Scores across Hospital Size for Output Quality Measures (Number of 
Beds / 100) (Fixed Effects Weighted Least Squares) 
 
VARIABLES 
HUFT_TEP 
(45013) 
HUFT_TEP 
(45059) 
HUFT_TEP 
(45108) 
KAROT 
(68415) 
KNIE_TEP 
(45059) 
KNIE_TEP 
(47390) 
YEAR 08 -0.4306 -0.5618*** -0.2593*** 0.2844 -0.3850** 0.0053 
 (0.323) (0.107) (0.082) (0.560) (0.159) (0.137) 
BEDS 06 * YEAR 08 0.0273 0.0181 0.0192 -0.0218 -0.0061 0.0121 
 (0.032) (0.021) (0.014) (0.034) (0.023) (0.015) 
CONSTANT 0.7625*** 2.3419*** 0.8197*** 2.4934*** 1.9073*** 0.4917*** 
 (0.146) (0.055) (0.049) (0.294) (0.089) (0.079) 
Observations 1,930 1,926 1,930 724 1,755 1,757 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A14a: How Does the Score for “Presence of Pediatrician in Cases of Premature Infants” Change 
with the Number of Hospitals Providing Care in Obstetrics within a Given Radius? (Fixed Effects 
Weighted Least Squares) 
 
VARIABLES GEBH (737) 
YEAR 08 6.5992** 4.3890** 4.6806** 4.7150** 5.2915*** 5.2808*** 
(2.874) (2.137) (2.027) (1.985) (2.021) (2.019) 
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 5 KM * YEAR 08 17.6113***      
(4.904)      
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 5 KM * YEAR 08 
* GEBH (737)  06 
-0.2369***      
(0.047)      
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 10 KM * YEAR 
08 
 8.3011***     
 (2.453)     
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 10 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (737)  06 
 -0.1003***     
 (0.025)     
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 15 KM * YEAR 
08 
  5.4719***    
  (1.448)    
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 15 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (737)  06 
  -0.0671***    
  (0.015)    
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 20 KM * YEAR 
08 
   3.8902***   
   (0.938)   
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 20 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (737)  06 
   -0.0485***   
   (0.010)   
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 25 KM * YEAR 
08 
    2.9368***  
    (0.717)  
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 25 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (737)  06 
    -0.0379***  
    (0.008)  
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 30 KM * YEAR 
08 
     2.3122*** 
     (0.549) 
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 30 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (737) 06 
     -0.0301*** 
     (0.006) 
CONSTANT 75.1711*** 75.1499*** 75.1507*** 75.1523*** 75.1475*** 75.1494*** 
(0.821) (0.842) (0.837) (0.828) (0.826) (0.822) 
Observations 1,116 1,116 1,116 1,116 1,116 1,116 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A14b: How Does the Score for “Prenatal Corticosteroid Therapy” Change with the Number of 
Hospitals Providing Care in Obstetrics within a Given Radius? (Fixed Effects Weighted Least Squares) 
 
VARIABLES GEBH (49523) 
YEAR 08 20.5194*** 13.1857*** 14.5949*** 15.5225*** 16.3293*** 16.1219*** 
(4.706) (3.448) (3.417) (3.346) (3.450) (3.492) 
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 5 KM * YEAR 08 26.8111***      
(7.404)      
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 5 KM * YEAR 08 
* GEBH (49523)  06 
-0.4085***      
(0.075)      
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 10 KM * YEAR 
08 
 16.3905***     
 (3.837)     
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 10 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (49523)  06 
 -0.2033***     
 (0.042)     
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 15 KM * YEAR 
08 
  9.4500***    
  (3.360)    
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 15 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (49523)  06 
  -0.1202***    
  (0.035)    
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 20 KM * YEAR 
08 
   6.2950***   
   (1.860)   
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 20 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (49523)  06 
   -0.0826***   
   (0.020)   
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 25 KM * YEAR 
08 
    4.7181***  
    (1.449)  
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 25 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (49523)  06 
    -0.0641***  
    (0.016)  
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 30 KM * YEAR 
08 
     3.7843*** 
     (1.170) 
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 30 KM * YEAR 
08 * GEBH (49523) 06 
     -0.0516*** 
     (0.013) 
CONSTANT 69.1642*** 69.1561*** 69.1669*** 69.1631*** 69.1506*** 69.1651*** 
(1.017) (1.153) (1.171) (1.148) (1.134) (1.109) 
Observations 675 675 675 675 675 675 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A14c: How Does the Score for “E-E-Time in Emergency Cases of Caesarean” Change with the 
Number of Hospitals Providing Care in Obstetrics within a Given Radius? (Fixed Effects Weighted Least 
Squares) 
VARIABLES GEBH (82913) 
YEAR 08 1.3781 2.0473* 3.4967*** 2.7298** 3.5339** 3.6402** 
(1.414) (1.180) (1.304) (1.261) (1.383) (1.455) 
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 5 KM * YEAR 08 66.5891***      
(6.909)      
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 5 KM * YEAR 08 
* GEBH (82913)  06 
-0.6915***      
(0.069)      
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 10 KM * YEAR 08  42.2881***     
 (4.829)     
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 10 KM * YEAR 08 
* GEBH (82913)  06 
 -0.4382***     
 (0.049)     
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 15 KM * YEAR 08   22.1555***    
  (4.533)    
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 15 KM * YEAR 08 
* GEBH (82913)  06 
  -0.2324***    
  (0.046)    
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 20 KM * YEAR 08    18.4010***   
   (2.402)   
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 20 KM * YEAR 08 
* GEBH (82913)  06 
   -0.1912***   
   (0.024)   
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 25 KM * YEAR 08     13.4588***  
    (1.881)  
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 25 KM * YEAR 08 
* GEBH (82913)  06 
    -0.1409***  
    (0.019)  
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 30 KM * YEAR 08      10.1617*** 
     (1.352) 
NR OF HOSPITALS IN 30 KM * YEAR 08 
* GEBH (82913)  06 
     -0.1066*** 
     (0.014) 
CONSTANT 92.7145*** 92.6951*** 92.6796*** 92.6873*** 92.6909*** 92.6945*** 
(0.363) (0.441) (0.479) (0.455) (0.462) (0.459) 
Observations 1,237 1,237 1,237 1,237 1,237 1,237 
*: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
  
79 
 
Table A15a: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Input (Process) 
Quality Measures (Hospitals for Which Documentation Rate Declined are Excluded) (Fixed Effects 
Weighted Least Squares) 
 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES CHOL (44800) 
YEAR 08 1.9282*** 0.1021 -0.5294***  0.3234*** 
 (0.193) (0.089) (0.071)  (0.079) 
CONSTANT 96.9917*** 99.0778*** 99.9657***  98.8982*** 
 (0.130) (0.061) (0.047)  (0.053) 
Observations 409 371 720  1,500 
VARIABLES GEBH (737) 
YEAR 08 34.8225*** 9.8982** 2.4473*** -15.2493*** 5.2888*** 
 (5.933) (4.128) (0.717) (3.726) (1.813) 
CONSTANT 7.6058** 69.7543*** 93.3609*** 99.4404*** 73.5792*** 
 (3.269) (2.620) (0.481) (2.379) (1.143) 
Observations 224 174 201 191 790 
VARIABLES GEBH (49523) 
YEAR 08 87.2594*** 32.0562*** 0.5037  13.9486*** 
 (14.715) (4.279) (1.683)  (2.761) 
CONSTANT 0.2380 54.6185*** 93.1399***  69.8574*** 
 (2.989) (2.705) (1.037)  (1.527) 
Observations 123 87 267  477 
VARIABLES GEBH (82913) 
YEAR 08 25.4351*** -2.1143***   4.5153*** 
 (3.901) (0.509)   (1.191) 
CONSTANT 65.9960*** 99.9539***   92.0748*** 
 (2.477) (0.297)   (0.725) 
Observations 229 648   877 
VARIABLES GYN_OP (47637) 
YEAR 08 24.7786*** 1.4308** -0.9227*** -4.7786 4.6438*** 
 (2.682) (0.639) (0.273) (3.357) (1.103) 
CONSTANT 64.6049*** 94.1465*** 98.2541*** 99.8363*** 89.9921*** 
 (1.825) (0.435) (0.179) (2.274) (0.743) 
Observations 275 301 309 244 1,129 
VARIABLES GYN_OP (50554) 
YEAR 08 4.8456*** -0.3433***   0.9714*** 
 (1.387) (0.063)   (0.369) 
CONSTANT 94.3670*** 99.7426***   98.3701*** 
 (0.949) (0.043)   (0.255) 
Observations 312 886   1,198 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation.  
ð The number of cases in the relevant service area is used as weights. 
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Table A15b: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Input (Process) 
Quality Measures (Hospitals for Which Documentation Rate Declined are Excluded) (Fixed Effects 
Weighted Least Squares) 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (75973) 
YEAR 08 11.0433*** 3.6902*** 0.7870*** -1.2650*** 3.4018*** 
 (1.751) (0.430) (0.301) (0.345) (0.452) 
CONSTANT 81.6538*** 92.1214*** 96.2365*** 99.1849*** 92.6008*** 
 (1.205) (0.280) (0.199) (0.231) (0.305) 
Observations 261 278 316 238 1,093 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (9962) 
YEAR 08 20.8776*** 7.0579*** 1.9904*** -0.9623** 7.3686*** 
 (1.649) (0.365) (0.421) (0.396) (0.663) 
CONSTANT 73.6673*** 88.9645*** 94.0179*** 98.1118*** 88.5379*** 
 (1.109) (0.251) (0.275) (0.276) (0.451) 
Observations 259 272 258 250 1,039 
VARIABLES KAROT (9556) 
YEAR 08 11.3980*** -0.1938 -4.8223***  1.1152 
 (2.493) (1.145) (1.105)  (1.037) 
CONSTANT 79.9280*** 92.0218*** 98.0751***  91.2450*** 
 (1.717) (0.805) (0.742)  (0.708) 
Observations 140 161 219  520 
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (43757) 
YEAR 08 8.8244*** 1.6388** -0.4599 -1.6285** 2.0634*** 
 (2.351) (0.662) (0.514) (0.625) (0.606) 
CONSTANT 79.8056*** 90.0586*** 94.8042*** 98.4399*** 90.6243*** 
 (1.621) (0.391) (0.319) (0.407) (0.394) 
Observations 191 211 228 142 772 
VARIABLES MAMMA (46201) 
YEAR 08 6.7643*** 1.1831** -0.2917  1.2627*** 
 (1.680) (0.524) (0.224)  (0.339) 
CONSTANT 89.4010*** 97.3910*** 99.4862***  97.1936*** 
 (0.918) (0.362) (0.149)  (0.224) 
Observations 203 255 428  886 
VARIABLES MAMMA (68100) 
YEAR 08 31.1947*** 9.6555*** -1.7772**  6.7768*** 
 (4.255) (1.234) (0.725)  (1.132) 
CONSTANT 54.6042*** 84.3811*** 97.6884***  86.6637*** 
 (2.948) (0.887) (0.498)  (0.808) 
Observations 173 232 410  815 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation.  
ð The number of cases in the relevant service area is used as weights. 
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Table A16a: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Output Quality 
Measures (Hospitals for Which Documentation Rate Declined are Excluded) (Fixed Effects Weighted 
Least Squares) 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (69891) 
YEAR 08 15.2084*** 1.7724*** -0.5315* -2.8739*** 2.0271*** 
 (4.666) (0.396) (0.287) (0.662) (0.643) 
CONSTANT 77.5437*** 91.6232*** 95.3241*** 99.0420*** 92.1718*** 
 (3.061) (0.262) (0.180) (0.431) (0.424) 
Observations 117 188 187 127 619 
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (69889) 
YEAR 08 -4.0419*** 0.2047 0.7400*** 1.9608*** -1.0000*** 
 (0.852) (0.374) (0.261) (0.610) (0.359) 
CONSTANT 10.6358*** 3.8748*** 1.0467*** -0.0065 5.2676*** 
 (0.538) (0.240) (0.165) (0.401) (0.223) 
Observations 170 181 102 170 623 
VARIABLES CHOL (44927) 
YEAR 08 -2.9138*** -0.0315 0.3424** 1.0726*** -0.2595 
 (1.058) (0.088) (0.143) (0.094) (0.256) 
CONSTANT 3.8982*** 1.1096*** 0.5133*** -0.0035 1.3164*** 
 (0.749) (0.060) (0.091) (0.063) (0.186) 
Observations 362 357 53 677 1,449 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (11255) 
YEAR 08 -2.0360*** -0.2082  0.5696*** -0.2072** 
 (0.199) (0.144)  (0.068) (0.081) 
CONSTANT 3.3776*** 1.0952***  0.0117 1.0324*** 
 (0.135) (0.091)  (0.044) (0.054) 
Observations 299 212  639 1,150 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (11264) 
YEAR 08 -2.6890*** -0.1146  1.0107*** -0.1077 
 (0.301) (0.199)  (0.115) (0.119) 
CONSTANT 5.2099*** 1.2540***  0.0554 1.5306*** 
 (0.198) (0.126)  (0.077) (0.078) 
Observations 310 165  685 1,160 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (11265) 
YEAR 08 -1.8595*** -0.1952  0.8895*** 0.0211 
 (0.266) (0.120)  (0.099) (0.093) 
CONSTANT 3.5940*** 1.0775***  0.0041 1.0367*** 
 (0.176) (0.078)  (0.064) (0.061) 
Observations 317 191  677 1,185 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation.  
ð The number of cases in the relevant service area is used as weights. 
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Table A16b: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Output Quality 
Measures (Hospitals for Which Documentation Rate Declined are Excluded) (Fixed Effects Weighted 
Least Squares) 
 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES HUFT_TEP (45013) 
YEAR 08 -3.0751* -0.1901***  0.3894*** -0.4435 
 (1.582) (0.039)  (0.048) (0.274) 
CONSTANT 3.5646*** 0.5504***  0.0143 0.8514*** 
 (1.108) (0.026)  (0.033) (0.194) 
Observations 341 269  763 1,373 
VARIABLES HUFT_TEP (45059) 
YEAR 08 -2.9474*** -0.9466*** 0.1431 1.1737*** -0.5090*** 
 (0.220) (0.141) (0.118) (0.265) (0.092) 
CONSTANT 5.9799*** 2.9624*** 1.3396*** 0.1994 2.3615*** 
 (0.147) (0.095) (0.077) (0.188) (0.062) 
Observations 364 359 368 269 1,360 
VARIABLES HUFT_TEP (45108) 
YEAR 08 -1.9796*** -0.0306  0.5701*** -0.2055** 
 (0.403) (0.062)  (0.069) (0.094) 
CONSTANT 2.8294*** 0.6648***  -0.0064 0.8475*** 
 (0.268) (0.040)  (0.047) (0.062) 
Observations 358 364  646 1,368 
VARIABLES KAROT (68415) 
YEAR 08 -3.8635** 0.7061**  2.6592*** 0.1978 
 (1.662) (0.275)  (0.396) (0.450) 
CONSTANT 6.6039*** 1.9091***  0.0968 2.4521*** 
 (1.268) (0.178)  (0.263) (0.323) 
Observations 132 146  194 474 
VARIABLES KNIE_TEP (45059) 
YEAR 08 -2.3135*** -0.8717*** 0.0054 0.9935*** -0.5401*** 
 (0.199) (0.107) (0.081) (0.102) (0.076) 
CONSTANT 4.5577*** 2.1232*** 0.9490*** 0.0225 1.8487*** 
 (0.138) (0.075) (0.056) (0.073) (0.054) 
Observations 323 328 276 327 1,254 
VARIABLES KNIE_TEP (47390) 
YEAR 08 -1.0562*** -0.1223**  0.3496*** -0.0624 
 (0.155) (0.052)  (0.035) (0.047) 
CONSTANT 1.8152*** 0.4666***  0.0034 0.4909*** 
 (0.104) (0.036)  (0.025) (0.032) 
Observations 301 189  769 1,259 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation.  
ð The number of cases in the relevant service area is used as weights. 
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Table A17a: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Input (Process) 
Quality Measures (Hospitals with Documentation Errors are Excluded) (Fixed Effects Weighted Least 
Squares) 
 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES CHOL (44800) 
YEAR 08 2.4357*** 0.0701 -0.5240***  0.4444*** 
 (0.581) (0.073) (0.057)  (0.164) 
CONSTANT 96.5067*** 99.0835*** 99.9580***  98.7719*** 
 (0.385) (0.050) (0.038)  (0.109) 
Observations 564 518 976  2,058 
VARIABLES GEBH (737) 
YEAR 08 33.9586*** 11.4046*** 2.5397*** -12.4221*** 5.6691*** 
 (5.439) (2.899) (0.528) (2.742) (1.356) 
CONSTANT 8.2202*** 69.8093*** 93.4739*** 99.4226*** 75.4060*** 
 (3.054) (1.831) (0.357) (1.762) (0.864) 
Observations 286 264 299 275 1,124 
VARIABLES GEBH (49523) 
YEAR 08 78.8298*** 37.0340*** 2.0979  14.5360*** 
 (22.370) (4.770) (1.340)  (2.458) 
CONSTANT 0.2310 51.3978*** 92.8539***  69.7202*** 
 (4.255) (2.740) (0.826)  (1.332) 
Observations 171 124 381  676 
VARIABLES GEBH (82913) 
YEAR 08 24.9511*** -2.1841***   3.9538*** 
 (3.158) (0.532)   (0.932) 
CONSTANT 68.2705*** 99.9060***   92.8123*** 
 (2.000) (0.329)   (0.583) 
Observations 306 949   1,255 
VARIABLES GYN_OP (47637) 
YEAR 08 22.6357*** 1.5659*** -1.2138*** -3.5712 4.2068*** 
 (2.200) (0.493) (0.326) (2.414) (0.834) 
CONSTANT 66.9495*** 94.0331*** 98.2448*** 99.8128*** 90.6646*** 
 (1.498) (0.330) (0.223) (1.633) (0.562) 
Observations 376 411 417 336 1,540 
VARIABLES GYN_OP (50554) 
YEAR 08 5.0006*** -0.3080***   1.0872*** 
 (1.200) (0.049)   (0.328) 
CONSTANT 94.0934*** 99.7421***   98.2485*** 
 (0.819) (0.033)   (0.226) 
Observations 432 1,194   1,626 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation.  
ð The number of cases in the relevant service area is used as weights. 
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Table A17b: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Input (Process) 
Quality Measures (Hospitals with Documentation Errors are Excluded) (Fixed Effects Weighted Least 
Squares) 
 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (75973) 
YEAR 08 11.8849*** 3.6603*** 0.7057*** -1.3801*** 3.6367*** 
 (1.607) (0.345) (0.263) (0.290) (0.417) 
CONSTANT 80.8052*** 92.0791*** 96.2397*** 99.2851*** 92.2480*** 
 (1.102) (0.232) (0.176) (0.198) (0.283) 
Observations 358 379 412 313 1,462 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (9962) 
YEAR 08 21.6642*** 7.1899*** 1.4190** -0.7393*** 7.3744*** 
 (1.569) (0.293) (0.600) (0.279) (0.606) 
CONSTANT 72.8122*** 88.9878*** 94.0430*** 98.1550*** 88.4297*** 
 (1.058) (0.200) (0.404) (0.188) (0.411) 
Observations 337 358 374 313 1,382 
VARIABLES KAROT (9556) 
YEAR 08 11.4496*** 0.3168 -4.4457***  1.2272 
 (2.328) (0.925) (0.869)  (0.889) 
CONSTANT 79.6337*** 92.0829*** 97.9119***  91.3971*** 
 (1.623) (0.636) (0.586)  (0.603) 
Observations 162 204 286  652 
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (43757) 
YEAR 08 7.7304*** 1.4891** -0.3786 -1.8701*** 1.9447*** 
 (1.622) (0.575) (0.446) (0.583) (0.490) 
CONSTANT 80.6995*** 89.9898*** 94.7587*** 98.5838*** 90.5245*** 
 (1.138) (0.351) (0.281) (0.394) (0.325) 
Observations 246 281 270 205 1,002 
VARIABLES MAMMA (46201) 
YEAR 08 8.0073*** 1.4394*** -0.1475  1.5745*** 
 (1.234) (0.329) (0.113)  (0.248) 
CONSTANT 89.0628*** 97.3713*** 99.4717***  97.1567*** 
 (0.818) (0.230) (0.079)  (0.175) 
Observations 284 422 645  1,351 
VARIABLES MAMMA (68100) 
YEAR 08 34.4536*** 9.9552*** -1.5649***  7.5159*** 
 (3.505) (0.934) (0.566)  (0.987) 
CONSTANT 53.3433*** 84.3476*** 97.6847***  86.2527*** 
 (2.281) (0.631) (0.385)  (0.679) 
Observations 241 372 594  1,207 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation.  
ð The number of cases in the relevant service area is used as weights. 
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Table A18a: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Output Quality 
Measures (Hospitals with Documentation Errors are Excluded) (Fixed Effects Weighted Least Squares) 
 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (69891) 
YEAR 08 14.8930*** 1.8159*** -0.4947* -2.9623*** 1.9326*** 
 (4.039) (0.355) (0.268) (0.565) (0.562) 
CONSTANT 77.5303*** 91.5474*** 95.2590*** 98.9860*** 92.2001*** 
 (2.707) (0.238) (0.172) (0.381) (0.380) 
Observations 150 232 229 177 788 
VARIABLES KORO_PCI (69889) 
YEAR 08 -4.9035*** 0.1012 0.7613*** 1.5692*** -1.3242*** 
 (0.993) (0.380) (0.224) (0.451) (0.404) 
CONSTANT 11.0449*** 3.8984*** 1.1185*** 0.0880 5.3948*** 
 (0.655) (0.245) (0.144) (0.309) (0.264) 
Observations 214 220 132 226 792 
VARIABLES CHOL (44927) 
YEAR 08 -1.8519*** -0.0848 0.3499*** 1.0259*** -0.0599 
 (0.191) (0.073) (0.120) (0.074) (0.068) 
CONSTANT 3.2397*** 1.1218*** 0.5071*** -0.0044 1.1752*** 
 (0.131) (0.050) (0.078) (0.051) (0.047) 
Observations 503 507 65 933 2,008 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (11255) 
YEAR 08 -2.0064*** -0.2213*  0.6152*** -0.1803** 
 (0.186) (0.120)  (0.059) (0.071) 
CONSTANT 3.4375*** 1.0859***  0.0184 1.0436*** 
 (0.128) (0.077)  (0.040) (0.048) 
Observations 388 294  846 1,528 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (11264) 
YEAR 08 -2.9482*** -0.0299  1.0111*** -0.0766 
 (0.278) (0.192)  (0.101) (0.108) 
CONSTANT 5.2789*** 1.3436***  0.0584 1.4790*** 
 (0.186) (0.127)  (0.068) (0.073) 
Observations 395 233  921 1,549 
VARIABLES HSM_IMPL (11265) 
YEAR 08 -1.8675*** -0.1389  0.8966*** 0.0391 
 (0.234) (0.117)  (0.085) (0.082) 
CONSTANT 3.5885*** 1.0453***  0.0077 1.0233*** 
 (0.157) (0.079)  (0.056) (0.055) 
Observations 403 270  907 1,580 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation.  
ð The number of cases in the relevant service area is used as weights. 
 
  
86 
 
Table A18b: Robustness Checks for the Change in Quality Scores across Waves for Output Quality 
Measures (Hospitals with Documentation Errors are Excluded) (Fixed Effects Weighted Least Squares) 
 
 1ST QUARTILE 2ND QUARTILE 3RD QUARTILE 4TH QUARTILE ALL 
VARIABLES HUFT_TEP (45013) 
YEAR 08 -2.5868** -0.1387***  0.3867*** -0.3210 
 (1.190) (0.034)  (0.041) (0.195) 
CONSTANT 3.1858*** 0.5372***  0.0162 0.7607*** 
 (0.846) (0.023)  (0.029) (0.141) 
Observations 433 395  1,015 1,843 
VARIABLES HUFT_TEP (45059) 
YEAR 08 -2.8884*** -1.0226*** 0.1509 1.1663*** -0.4976*** 
 (0.203) (0.116) (0.100) (0.195) (0.077) 
CONSTANT 5.9549*** 2.9931*** 1.3331*** 0.2190 2.3365*** 
 (0.140) (0.080) (0.067) (0.140) (0.053) 
Observations 461 499 502 365 1,827 
VARIABLES HUFT_TEP (45108) 
YEAR 08 -1.9085*** -0.0661  0.5632*** -0.1951*** 
 (0.307) (0.049)  (0.056) (0.071) 
CONSTANT 2.7700*** 0.6464***  -0.0016 0.8153*** 
 (0.206) (0.033)  (0.039) (0.047) 
Observations 479 500  852 1,831 
VARIABLES KAROT (68415) 
YEAR 08 -3.5719*** 0.5836**  2.5677*** 0.1095 
 (1.220) (0.244)  (0.337) (0.359) 
CONSTANT 6.3494*** 1.9197***  0.0805 2.4722*** 
 (0.932) (0.159)  (0.226) (0.258) 
Observations 161 194  246 603 
VARIABLES KNIE_TEP (45059) 
YEAR 08 -2.2661*** -0.4459 0.0515 1.0527*** -0.4134*** 
 (0.165) (0.376) (0.076) (0.110) (0.125) 
CONSTANT 4.6376*** 2.1145*** 0.9632*** 0.0067 1.9063*** 
 (0.117) (0.254) (0.053) (0.080) (0.085) 
Observations 419 443 370 409 1,641 
VARIABLES KNIE_TEP (47390) 
YEAR 08 -1.1323*** -0.1160***  0.5531*** 0.0294 
 (0.119) (0.044)  (0.211) (0.113) 
CONSTANT 1.8536*** 0.4777***  -0.0191 0.4910*** 
 (0.085) (0.031)  (0.141) (0.076) 
Observations 393 256  990 1,639 
ð *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level, t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ð In some cases two or more quartiles coincided. As such it was not possible to distinguish between them 
and they were pooled together in the estimation.  
ð The number of cases in the relevant service area is used as weights. 
 
 
